

CAN AQUINAS HOPE ‘THAT ALL MEN BE SAVED’?

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I. BALTHASAR AND AQUINAS

In the past few decades the question of whether we can, or even should, hope for the salvation of all people has become the subject of some controversy. At the center of this controversy is the late Swiss theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar, who has argued that Christians have a duty to hope for the salvation of all people.¹ Balthasar takes this duty to follow upon Christian charity insofar as this charity concerns the ultimate good of our neighbor.² But, Balthasar insists, this hope for all is precisely *hope* and not *knowledge*.³ In stressing this last point, Balthasar wants to distance himself from those who claim a certainty about universal salvation.⁴

Balthasar’s views on hoping for the salvation of all have been widely and spiritedly criticized. According to Regis Scanlon, in proposing that the Christian can and must hope for all, Balthasar ‘*contradicts* statements in [the] sacred Scriptures, Tradition, and the Magisterium of the Church.’⁵ Undoubtedly, one can find propositions in these three sources that do seem to make trouble for a doctrine of hoping for the salvation of all people, but we should also ask whether these propositions have been rightly understood or their dogmatic weight properly assessed by the critics who have used them as weapons against Balthasar.⁶ Furthermore, we should ask about those propositions in the same sources that seem to support Balthasar’s position.⁷ The *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, for example, seems to be close to Balthasar when it teaches that ‘[i]n every circumstance, each one of us should hope, with the grace of God, to persevere to the end and to obtain the joy of heaven, as God’s eternal reward for the good works accomplished with the grace of Christ. In hope, the Church prays for ‘all men to be saved’.’⁸ Donath Hercsik has argued that while Balthasar’s position is ‘somewhat adventurous,’ it nevertheless ‘remains within the limits of orthodoxy. It does not, in fact, contradict any ecumenical council nor the Symbols of the faith. It can be reconciled with the statements of the Bible, supposing that we interpret Jesus’s statements about hell parenetically.’⁹ I am not interested in this paper in taking a side in the debate over the orthodoxy of Balthasar’s views, but I would like to consider where we might situate St. Thomas Aquinas in the general debate about hoping for the salvation of all men.¹⁰ I find it quite surprising that there has not been any previous significant effort to do this. Balthasar’s own reading of Aquinas – which must be regarded as cursory even if insightful – will help to orient my reading of him.

On the topic of hoping for all, Balthasar sees Aquinas, along with Origen and Augustine, as an essential figure to confront in the tradition. In Balthasar’s view Aquinas’s teaching on the possibility of hoping for the salvation of others¹¹ marked an important shift in Christian thinking

on this question and perhaps even helped prepare the way for a theology of hope for all. According to Balthasar's account, from the Patristic era through the early Middle Ages, Christian theologians typically understood hope as a virtue that, although it directs us to eternal union with God as our ultimate happiness, fundamentally concerns only oneself. In other words, I can hope for my own salvation but not for the salvation of others. Balthasar sees St. Augustine as the originator of this view. Contrasting faith and hope in his *Enchiridion de Fide, Spe, et Caritate*, Augustine observes that . . .

faith may have for its object evil as well as good, for both good and evil are believed, and the faith that believes them is not evil but good. Moreover, faith is concerned about the past, present, and the future . . . Faith applies to one's own circumstances *and* those of others . . . But hope has for its object only what is good, only what is future, and *only what affects the one who entertains the hope*.¹²

Balthasar, taking his cue from the research of Jacques-Guy Bougerol, contends that for the next several centuries the Christian theological tradition followed Augustine on this point and regarded hope as being fundamentally self-oriented.¹³ It would only be Aquinas, Balthasar says, who would finally 'tear to shreds' this veil hanging over Christian hope.¹⁴ Faced with Augustine's view, Aquinas recognized that there is truth in it if we consider hope absolutely. But, he added, if we consider the charity that unites us with our fellows, there is a sense in which we can, indeed, hope for others as well. Thus, with his usual reverence for his Christian predecessors – and especially Augustine – Aquinas found a way to agree with them while introducing something new (or apparently so). For Balthasar, the novelty that Aquinas discreetly proposes here is revolutionary.

Aquinas's expansion of the horizon of hope allows the question of hoping for all to be raised, a question that Augustine's teaching (as Balthasar understands it) logically excludes. If I may hope for myself and others, may I hope not only for myself and a select group of others but for myself and *all* others? We know that Balthasar answers this question affirmatively, but where does Aquinas stand on the question of hoping for all?

There is no obvious evidence that Aquinas ever considers this question, although at times he seems on the verge. Given the interest that contemporary theology has taken in it, given the special status that Balthasar confers on Aquinas in the theology of hope, and given also Aquinas's authoritative role as the Church's *doctor communis*, however, it seems legitimate to risk a hypothesis about what his answer to this question *might* be. In working toward this hypothesis I shall argue that one can derive what appears to be a hope for all – and even a *duty* to maintain such hope – from the connection that Aquinas establishes between hope and charity. But we shall also see that such a hope seems to be in conflict with Aquinas's teaching on reprobation. Both of these points are suggested in Balthasar's reading of Aquinas. I will now return to that reading to try to bring out these aspects.

In his initial consideration of Aquinas's position on hoping for all in the fifth volume of his *Theo-drama*, Balthasar asserts that such a hope is not possible for Aquinas:

Thomas is reluctant to let [Augustine's] view stand; while he too acknowledges that 'hope is directed only to one's own good,' Christian love can join me so closely to a fellow human being that he means as much to me as myself . . . It is to be borne in mind, however, that the love referred to here is supernatural *caritas*, and he is speaking only of particular close individuals: for Thomas, on the basis of his eschatology, there can be no question of hoping for the salvation of all.¹⁵

Balthasar is right that the love that Aquinas is speaking of here is charity, but Aquinas does not restrict this charity to 'particular close individuals,' as Balthasar says. Aquinas never makes such a qualification. In fact, Aquinas holds that charity is something that Christians owe to *all* people.¹⁶ However, Balthasar's claim that Aquinas's eschatology shuts down the possibility of hoping for all is not far from the truth, although there is a certain amount of complexity here that needs to be untangled, as we shall see.

The remarks in *Theo-Drama V* were not Balthasar's last word on the matter. He addressed it again a few years later in two controversial little books, *Dare We Hope that All Men be Saved* and *A Short Discourse on Hell*. In *Dare We Hope* Balthasar seems to drop the strange idea he proposed in *Theo-Drama V* that Aquinas limits the Christian charity connected to hope to a few close individuals. Again seeming to follow the work of Bougerol, Balthasar now notes that in the *Compendium Theologiae* Aquinas links hope to a universal charity for others, one that imitates the charity that God has for all human beings.¹⁷ But, Balthasar suggests, the universal movement of this charity and hope seems to run up against an 'Augustinian' barrier in Aquinas.

The question that hovers in the background and remains unstated, is how far this love extends. If one believes in the twofold predestination advocated by Augustine and adheres, on the basis of that, to the certainty that a number of people will be damned, one might object that love would have to stop at this barrier. But we are not forced by Scripture to make such an assumption. Thus, at most, a barrier might be erected at the point where the sinner irrevocably rejects God's unconditional love. Would not, then, our love, too, have to reach out as far as God's *caritas* does?¹⁸

I do not think that we need to wonder whether Balthasar has Aquinas in mind when he mentions here those who believe in the 'twofold predestination advocated by Augustine.' Students of the Angelic Doctor will understandably object that Aquinas does not accept a double predestination but teaches instead the positive predestination of some to eternal life and the negative reprobation of others, who will be eternally lost.¹⁹ I think that it is probably the case that Balthasar, like other commentators – whether justifiably or not – does not regard the difference between double predestination and positive predestination/negative reprobation as all that significant in the end.²⁰

In his doctrine of predestination and reprobation Aquinas distinguishes between God's 'antecedent' and 'consequent will,' trying by means of this distinction to explain how it is that God can will, as St. Paul says, that 'all men be saved,'²¹ and at the same time will that some not receive the grace necessary for salvation and subsequently be damned.²² 'God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as his justice exacts,' Aquinas says.²³ We will consider this theory further later in this paper. For now, I simply want to note that Balthasar rejects it. For Balthasar, the theory unwarrantedly assumes that certain people *will* be damned. Balthasar does agree that there are passages – even *many* passages – in the New Testament that appear to suggest the damnation of some people as a certainty but, following the proposal of Karl Rahner and others, he says that these statements could arguably be read as warnings (as is undeniably the case with many similar statements in the Old Testament) rather than 'anticipatory reports.'²⁴ In Balthasar's opinion we have to take seriously both the warnings about damnation and the hints about the possibility of all men being saved, and not peremptorily take it upon ourselves to decide the outcome of divine judgment.²⁵ But even if we do leave the matter open in this way, Balthasar adds, *hope* for all is *still* permitted us and can even be regarded as a duty.²⁶

If there is any tendency in Aquinas toward this hope, Balthasar believes that it is finally short-circuited by Aquinas's teaching on reprobation. Balthasar doubts, however, that Christian theology should accept such a teaching.²⁷

I think that Balthasar's later reading of St. Thomas is basically accurate but it does have a couple of significant weaknesses. First, although Balthasar suggests a possibility of hoping for the salvation of all men in Aquinas's texts, he does not go very far in exploring this possibility. Second, and similarly, he does not take any time to consider in depth the conflict between hoping for all and the doctrine of reprobation. In sum, while Balthasar's later reading is provocative and insightful, it is thin on careful textual analysis (appearing to rely to a large extent on Bougerol's reading of Aquinas) and underdeveloped. I do not believe we can really fault Balthasar for these weaknesses since it was not his purpose in these two short books to write a scholarly treatise on Aquinas so much as to sketch out his own position vis-à-vis the tradition. What I would like to do in this paper, therefore, is to make up for what is lacking in Balthasar's treatment of Aquinas.²⁸

II. HOPING FOR OTHERS

To begin doing this, then, I will start this section with a look at Aquinas's general concept of hope itself and then move on to what he has to say about hoping for others. This provides the essential basis for seeing later how one can argue for a *duty* to hope for all in Aquinas's thought.

Aquinas's treatment of hope takes this virtue's natural and supernatural iterations into consideration. On the natural level Aquinas defines hope as a certain movement (*extensionem*) of the irascible appetite toward a future good that is arduous but possible to achieve or obtain.²⁹ More specifically, this 'movement' of the irascible appetite is a confident expectation that this good will be achieved or obtained.³⁰ Some commentators read Aquinas as taking hope to be not only a movement of the appetite but also as a natural virtue inasmuch as it belongs to magnanimity (which is about great and difficult things) but others claim that, at the natural level, Aquinas does not regard it as a virtue, strictly speaking.³¹ This question need not detain us here since we are only interested in what Aquinas has to say about supernatural hope. As a supernatural theological virtue, Aquinas understands hope as a certain grace-bestowed confident expectation of our salvation – that is, future eternal union with God – as a good that, as with the good aimed at by natural hope, is not easily attained but is possible with God's help.³²

There are three places where Aquinas applies his general view of hope to the question of hoping for the salvation of others. The first place is in his commentary on the third book of Peter Lombard's *Sentences*. He then takes it up again in the *Summa* and the *Quaestio disputata de spe*. We will look at all three texts.

Aquinas's treatment of hoping for others in the *Sentences* commentary is so minimal that it is perhaps hardly worth discussing, save for the fact that it is the first place in his writings that he pronounces on the issue and seems to distance himself from Augustine's perceived position. In responding to the passage from Augustine's *Enchiridion* that we quoted earlier, Aquinas simply notes that we can indeed hope for another person if we are hoping for what we judge to be good for that person.³³ And this is where Aquinas leaves the matter. One would certainly like Aquinas to say more here, especially if it is true that his position on hoping for others is so non-traditional. Fortunately, Aquinas spends much more time on the question in the *Summa*. In II-II, q. 17, a. 3 he again considers Augustine's teaching on hope in the *Enchiridion*. The objections in this article all argue in favor of hoping for the salvation of others. Aquinas draws

the article's *sed contra* from the *Enchiridion*'s claim that hope is limited to ourselves. In his *respondeo* Aquinas will find reasons for agreeing with both the objections and the *sed contra*. Let us consider the article in detail.

The first objection turns to the opening of St. Paul's Letter to the Philippians, where the Apostle writes about his confidence that God would, 'on the day of Jesus Christ,' bring to perfection the work begun in the Christians at Philippi (cf. 1:6). This line of St. Paul is interpreted as evidence of his hoping for the eternal beatitude of others since the 'perfection' of 'the day of Jesus Christ' is understood by the objector precisely as 'eternal beatitude.' The objector is also assuming that St. Paul is tacitly expressing hope in this passage since the word hope does not appear in this part of the text of the Letter to the Philippians. Be that as it may, the objector's exegesis seems reasonable and would appear to provide some biblical basis for hoping for the salvation of others.

The second objection also appeals to Sacred Scripture, citing the Letter of St. James in the minor premise of its argument. The argument is a simple one. The first premise asserts that we can hope to obtain from God whatever we ask of him. The second premise quotes St. James's exhortation to his readers 'to pray for one another, that you may be saved' (5:16). The obvious conclusion, then, is that 'we can hope for the eternal happiness of others.'

Ironically, the third and final objection makes use of a text of Augustine's that appears implicitly to suggest the possibility of hoping for others. In one of his sermons Augustine tells his congregation that we should not despair of another person during his or her life.³⁴ The objector, seeing that Augustine regards *despair* of another as possible even if illegitimate, takes this to open the door to the possibility of *hoping* for another. Presumably, this is an acceptable inference because despair is among the vices contrary to the virtue of hope. Whether or not Augustine would have allowed this inference, it certainly appears plausible in itself.

So all the objections seem to provide decent reasons for hoping for the salvation of others. The arguments may not be iron-clad yet it is easy to imagine developing them further and strengthening them. We will not have to do this ourselves, however, since Aquinas will argue on their behalf himself.

The article's *sed contra* cites the passage from Augustine's *Enchiridion* in which hope seems to be restricted to the self.

In the *respondeo* Aquinas says that we can consider hope either 'absolutely' or 'with something else being presupposed.'³⁵ If hope is considered absolutely, he says, then it is always about an arduous good and pertains *only to the person who is hoping*. What Aquinas is saying here is that if I consider hope in itself, it has only to do with me as the one hoping and does not include others. But why should this be so? Aquinas claims that a thing's movement is always a movement toward that thing's own end and not the end pertaining to some other thing; so, hope, as a supernaturally instilled movement of my soul towards my salvation, can only be about me as the one tending towards that end.

However, Aquinas continues, if we consider hope 'with something else being presupposed,' there is a possibility of having hope for others too. This 'something else' that is presupposed is the love or charity that unites us to other people. 'Union,' Aquinas observes, 'is of things that are distinct, wherefore love can directly regard the other whom a man unites to himself by love, looking upon this other as his own self.'³⁶ If charity moves me to regard this other person as I regard myself, and so makes this person my 'other self,' so to speak, then it would seem that I could hope for his or her salvation just as I would hope for my own salvation. And this is precisely what Aquinas concludes:

Yet if we presuppose the union of love with another, one can hope for and desire something for another, as for himself; and, accordingly, he can hope for another's eternal life, inasmuch as he is united to him by love. And just as it is the same virtue of charity whereby a man loves God, himself, and his neighbor, so too it is the same virtue of hope, whereby a man hopes for himself and for another.³⁷

Aquinas thinks that his argument in the *respondeo* is a sufficient reply to the objections and thus does not respond to them individually. We can see that he does not at all disagree with their conclusions. In response to them he simply tries to clarify the exact way in which hoping for others is logically and theologically possible.

Aquinas's treatment of hoping for others in the *Summa* adds a great deal to his all-too-brief treatment of this theme in the commentary on the Sentences, where Aquinas does not give any real argument for why we may hope for others but merely says that it is possible to do so if we are hoping for what we take to be good for them. The *Summa* supplies the argumentation that the commentary on the *Sentences* lacks.

The position on hoping for others that Aquinas outlines in the *De Spe*, q. 4 is similar to the one he presents in the *Summa*.³⁸ In his reflection on hope in this text Aquinas considers the same objection that he had entertained as the third objection in the *Summa* article, although this time he does not cite Augustine's sermon as the source. 'Hope and despair are found with respect to the same things,' the objection asserts. 'But,' it continues, 'we can despair about someone else, which is why we are commanded not to despair about anyone who is still on the journey. Therefore, we can also hope for someone else.'³⁹ Making the same inference that is made in the *Summa* objection, the objector suggests that if we can despair about others, we can also hope for them. A second objection argues along the same lines as the *respondeo* of the *Summa* article, connecting hope for others with charity: '[O]ne and the same virtue of charity makes us love ourselves and our neighbor. Therefore one and the same virtue of hope makes us hope for eternal life for ourselves and others.'⁴⁰

In his *respondeo* in the *De Spe* text Aquinas agrees that one may hope for the salvation of others, but he introduces a distinction between hoping principally for oneself and secondarily for others that was not in the *Summa*'s treatment of the question, at least not explicitly. 'With respect to the person doing the hoping,' Aquinas writes, 'the principal object is that one hopes for beatitude for oneself; secondarily, one may hope for others to possess [beatitude] insofar as they are in some way united with one, and one desires and hopes for their good as one's own.'⁴¹ That which unites us with others and allows us to hope for them is, of course, charity, as the *Summa* and the second objection here point out. But what are we to make of the distinction Aquinas maintains here between hoping principally for oneself and secondarily for others? I think the answer is quite simple. Aquinas is just following his understanding of the *ordo caritatis*. If it is by charity that we are able to hope for others, then what we might call the 'order of hope' will map onto the order of charity. In the order of charity, as Aquinas conceives it, God has priority since charity has essentially to do with the friendship of human beings with God; it has secondly to do with ourselves, and lastly to do with our neighbor.⁴² So, hope must follow the order of charity and therefore we hope primarily for ourselves and secondarily for others.⁴³

Is this hoping for the salvation of others only something that is *possible* and that we *may* do if we so wish, or is it not only possible but a *duty*? We know that Balthasar insists that it is a duty. Does St. Thomas likewise take it to be a duty? In the texts of Aquinas that we have looked at he does not use the language of duty, rather he consistently uses that of *possibility*, of what is *permitted*: '... aliquis *potest* desiderare et sperare aliquid alteri. . . .'⁴⁴ Nevertheless, I do not think that we should too hastily conclude that hoping for others is for Aquinas a counsel only

and not a precept. On the contrary, I think it can be argued that Aquinas understands that hoping for the salvation of others is an obligation for Christians, or, more minimally, that this is logically entailed in his theology. Let me try to say why I think that this is so.

First of all, in the texts where he discusses hoping for others, Aquinas is mostly concerned with establishing, against the apparent position of Augustine and the tradition, that hope does not have to be restricted to oneself. Before he could even begin talking about a duty to hope for others, Aquinas has first to show that it is *possible* to hope for others because the tradition seems to hold that it is not.

Moreover, Aquinas does evidently take theological hope *generally* as a Christian duty: '[I]n order to be saved,' he writes in the *Summa*, 'it is man's duty (*debitum*) to hope in God.'⁴⁵ And in this same part of the *Summa* Aquinas answers the question about whether there is a precept of hope in the affirmative.⁴⁶ Clearly, then, as a Christian, I am bound to hope for my salvation. It is not a matter of personal preference. But Aquinas will likewise insist that it is a duty to have charity toward our neighbor, whether or not he or she is a sinner, a friend, or an enemy.⁴⁷ It certainly appears, then, that an obligation to hope for others naturally follows from all of this. If I have a duty to hope for my salvation and a duty to love others, and if it is the union of charity that allows me to hope for others as other selves, then unless I hoped for their salvation as well, I would not be completely faithful to the precepts of hope and charity. I must hope for others inasmuch as I am identified with them in charity. I could only exclude others from hope if I did not love them or if I did not hope for myself. But as a Christian I am bound to do both.

Someone might say that since Aquinas claims in the *De spe* that hope must be primarily for ourselves and only secondarily for others, hope for others cannot be a duty but at best a counsel. However, this objection rests on the dubious assumption that, generally speaking, if some duties take precedence over others, we are absolved of the latter. While this may be true in some instances, it is not necessarily true for all instances. My duties to my family take precedence over my duties to my friends; but this does not mean that I have no duties to my friends, or that these duties could not regard matters in which I also have a prior obligation to my family. More importantly, Aquinas himself rejects this assumption; one place where he does so is in his treatment of charity, which of course is directly relevant to our discussion. For Aquinas the *duty* of charity has not only to do with our neighbor, but with God and ourselves as well.⁴⁸ As we have seen, however, in the order of charity God comes first, then ourselves, and finally our neighbor. And yet Aquinas does not consider love of self and love of neighbor any less obligatory because they come *after* love of God. If the order of hope is determined by the order of charity, then the priority of hoping for ourselves would not dispense us from the obligation to hope for others.

Although we must admit that there does not appear to be any text where Aquinas plainly affirms a duty to hope for others, nevertheless, on his own principles, he would have to allow that hoping for the salvation of others is a Christian duty.

III. HOPING FOR ALL

So far we have seen that Aquinas holds that we can hope for the salvation of others, and I have just now argued that Aquinas could be understood to endorse this hoping for others as a duty. Would Aquinas also countenance hoping for the salvation of *all* people? Love as charity opens the way for Aquinas to hoping for others, but how far – to ask the question in the manner that Balthasar does in his discussion of Aquinas – does this love extend? Is it a love for all and

therefore a hope for all? I said at the beginning of this paper that the connection that Aquinas develops between hope and charity establishes a basis for a hope for all. Let me now explain why I think that this is so.

To do this we must first fill in some more details about the charity that Aquinas says we owe our neighbor. According to Aquinas, we must love our neighbor because our neighbor belongs to God. In loving our friends, he says, we also love all that belongs to them. So too in our friendship with God we love not only God but all that belongs to him. Here is how Aquinas puts it:

Friendship extends to a person in two ways: first in respect of himself, and in this way friendship never extends but to one's friends: secondly, it extends to someone in respect of another, as, when a man who has friendship for a certain person, loves, for his friend's sake, all belonging to his friend, be they children, servants, or connected with him in any way. Indeed so much do we love our friends, that for their sake we love all who belong to them, even if they hurt or hate us; so that, in this way, the friendship of charity extends even to our enemies, whom we love out of charity in relation to God, to whom the friendship of charity is chiefly directed.⁴⁹

The friendship of charity, whereby we love our neighbor, therefore, has its basis in our love of God. Following Aristotle, Aquinas regards wishing good things for our friends as an essential note of friendship.⁵⁰ So, loving our neighbor in charity entails wishing him or her good things. But what, concretely, are the good things that we wish for our neighbor? For Aquinas there is, above all, one good thing that we wish our neighbor, that is, eternal beatitude, salvation, since this is the best, the highest good for our neighbor as a human being.⁵¹

In the previous section we saw that in Aquinas's view charity obliges us to love our neighbor regardless of his or her status as a sinner, a friend, or an enemy. A line in the passage I have just presented reinforces this view: 'the friendship of charity,' Aquinas says, 'extends even to our enemies, whom we love out of charity in relation to God.' Aquinas also suggests in this passage that in charity we love all those who belong to God. These statements taken together certainly incline us to think that Aquinas supposes the precept of charity to be fairly far-reaching. But when Aquinas speaks of sinners, friends, and enemies, and of all who belong to God, perhaps he only has the Christian fold in mind. Surely these three classes of people all have a place in the community of believers. Aquinas, however, in his consideration of the object of charity in the *Summa* will make it evident that in his mind it is not only Christians that belong to God but man as such.⁵² Consequently, our charity must be universal, it must extend to all men, believers and non-believers alike, as human beings.⁵³ This is why Aquinas is able to say elsewhere that 'we must (*debemus*) love all men'⁵⁴ and 'we wish all men the same general good, namely, eternal beatitude.'⁵⁵

Aquinas argues for the same conclusion in a different way in the *Compendium Theologiae* in the same passage on which Balthasar's and Bougerol's treatments focus. There Aquinas, in a reflection on the meaning of the petitions of the *Pater Noster*, says that just as children ought to be imitators of their parents, 'he who professes that God is his Father must be an imitator of God'⁵⁶ and a little further on adds:

He who looks upon himself as a son of God, must (*debet*), among other things, imitate our Lord especially in his charity, as we are urged to do in Ephesians 5:1: 'Be therefore followers of God as most dear children, and walk in love.' God's love is not restricted to any individual, but embraces all in common, for God loves 'all things that are,' as is said in Wisdom 11:25. Most of all he loves men, according to Deuteronomy 33:3: 'He has loved the people.'⁵⁷

The charity that we owe to all people is in this passage derived not, as we saw in the *Summa*, from our friendship with God but from our duty as Christians to imitate him. As God's charity reaches out to all, so should ours.

Whether Aquinas bases charity towards all on our friendship with God or on our imitation of God, it is important to notice that in both cases Aquinas says that we *must* love all people, *debemus*. We have here, again, not a counsel but a precept, a duty.⁵⁸ We can now come back to the question of hope. Through charity, as we have seen, we identify ourselves with others but we now see that through charity we identify in principle not only with a particular group of others but with all people, they all become other selves. And Aquinas seems to be telling us that this identification is a duty: we *must* identify with all people. Since hoping for ourselves and others is also a duty – as I showed above – it certainly would seem to follow that we have a duty to hope for the salvation of all. As far as I know, Aquinas does not, anywhere in his writings, say that we have a duty to hope for the salvation of all people. I am simply arguing that such a duty seems to follow plainly from other propositions that he holds about hope and charity. If those propositions are to be affirmed, then I believe we must also affirm the proposition that Christians have a duty to hope for the salvation of all people.

But (1) if the duty to hope for all is logically implied by what Aquinas teaches about hope and charity, why did Aquinas himself never conclude to this duty? Perhaps (2) I am mistaken and there is no such implication in Aquinas's thought and this is why Aquinas does not say anywhere that we must hope for all. And (3) in the end am I not simply distorting Aquinas's theology by looking at it through an obviously modern lens?

In reply to the first query I would say that all sorts of things can be implied in a person's thought without him or her ever becoming aware of them or articulating what is implied. We all know this and we all know that this is true of Aquinas's thought as well. An essential element in any intellectual tradition is the work the disciples do to develop what remained only implicit in the thought of the master. Thomism would probably not exist today if this sort of development were not a part of it. And most of us want to say that these developments are faithful to the thought of the master insofar as they simply render actual in some sense what was really there *in potentia* in the master's thought.

As for the suggestion that Aquinas's thought might not imply the hope for all that I am arguing it does, I think that this would be quite difficult to *show*; one would have either to reject the propositions that I have linked together, which would mean denying propositions that Aquinas takes to be true; or else to argue that the propositions cannot really be so joined. The latter, I believe, would be just as problematic as the former since I think the warrant for proceeding as I have is clearly established by Aquinas's reasoning in II-II, q. 17, a. 3 and in *De Spe*, q. 4. Refuting my argument, then, would also involve calling that reasoning into question.

The objection about looking at Aquinas through a modern lens can also be answered. The question about hoping for all may indeed be more of a modern question than a mediaeval one, but in my argument, I have only appealed to Aquinas's text and not to any modern sensibilities. I do not think I am putting anything into the text that is not evidently there.

Where we might run into serious trouble, however, is in Aquinas's doctrine of reprobation.

IV. PREDESTINATION AND REPROBATION

If Aquinas's teaching on hope and charity does ineluctably lead to a duty to hope for the salvation of all people (as I think it does), even if Aquinas himself does not realize this or draw this conclusion, this hope would be in tension with his teaching on reprobation.

I already touched on Aquinas's doctrine of reprobation in my discussion of Balthasar's reading of Aquinas. Again, according to this doctrine, God predestines some to salvation and reprobates others, that is, he allows them to fall away from the right path and damns them. Aquinas understands the outcome of predestination and reprobation to be certain: some people will definitely be saved and others definitely damned. In fact, Aquinas thinks that the number of those who will definitely be damned will be greater than the number of those who will be saved.⁵⁹ Aquinas is even convinced that he knows of particular historical people who will be damned: Judas, for instance.⁶⁰

The salvation of the predestined is guaranteed because in his providence God knows and wills that he will give them the grace they need to be saved while the damnation of the reprobate is likewise guaranteed because in his providence God knows and wills that he will *withhold* the grace they need to be saved.⁶¹ What God determines in his providence, Aquinas maintains, will unfailingly come about because of the certainty of divine knowledge and the efficaciousness of the divine will, which constitute the principles of providence.⁶² So, again it is impossible that those whom God has predestined not be saved and those whom he has reprobated not be damned.

But in claiming that God wills some people to be saved (predestination) and wills to let others fall away from the right path (reprobation), how does Aquinas get around St. Paul's teaching that God wills all people to be saved? This is where Aquinas's distinction between God's antecedent will and consequent will, that I mentioned before, comes into play. The distinction, which Aquinas takes from St. John Damascene, is not an easy one to grasp.⁶³ In the *Summa* Aquinas uses an example drawn from a legal context to try to explain it. A just judge, he says, would recognize that in general it is good for human beings to live and not be killed. So, we would say that, all things being equal, that judge wants, or wills, people to live. But the judge may determine that a particular person, a murderer, should be executed and makes this determination not on the basis of the person's humanity (which, considered abstractly, would only be a reason to will him to live) but because he is a murderer. Therefore, the judge wants *this* person to be killed, not – it is key to note – *qua* human being, but because the person is also a murderer. Or, putting it differently: the judge wills simply the execution of the murderer; but, in a qualified manner, the judge wills him or her to live *qua* human being. What the judge wills simply rather than what the judge wills in a qualified sense is, of course, what he or she will finally act on. Whatever our views on capital punishment, I think we can understand the logic at work here. Aquinas would speak of the judge's prior disposition in regard to the good of human life as his or her antecedent will and the disposition toward this particular person *qua* murderer as the judge's consequent will.⁶⁴ Applying this reasoning to predestination and reprobation, Aquinas writes:

Because, then, God has made all men for beatitude, he is said to will the salvation of all by his antecedent will. But because some work against their own salvation, and the order of his wisdom does not admit of their attaining salvation in view of their failure, he fulfills in them in another way the demands of his goodness, damning them out of justice. As a result, falling short of the first order of his will, they thus slip into the second [i.e., the order of his consequent will]. And although they do not do God's will, his will is still fulfilled in them. But the failure constituting sin, by which a person is made deserving of punishment here and now or in the future, is not itself willed by God with either an antecedent or a consequent will; it is merely permitted by him. It should not, however, be concluded from what has just been said that God's intention can be frustrated, because from all eternity God has foreseen that the one who is not saved would not be saved. Nor did he ordain that particular one for salvation in the order of predestination, which is the order of his absolute will. But as far as he was concerned, he gave that creature a nature intended for beatitude.⁶⁵

By his antecedent will God wills the salvation of all people since he has made human beings for beatitude. Yet he *permits* some to fall away and damns them by his consequent will. But, Aquinas adds, those who are damned were never really willed to be saved in the first place, except in the abstract but inconsequential sense *qua* human beings made for beatitude.

What we have said up to this point may seem to imply that people's free actions have no impact on their final destiny. There is one sense in which, in Aquinas's view, this is true, and another sense in which it is not. It is true in the sense that predestination and reprobation are determined completely apart from any divine foreknowledge of the actions that we will do.⁶⁶ Were it otherwise, were we the ones who determined whether we were predestined or reprobate, Aquinas argues, we would have to admit an external cause of the divine will, a possibility that Aquinas is unwilling to accept.⁶⁷ But the salvific actions of the predestined and the damning actions of the reprobate are all done freely, even if not apart from divine causality, which is able to cause free actions to be done freely.⁶⁸

What is the background to Aquinas's teaching on predestination and reprobation? How does he justify this teaching? We will not be able to go into all the details but will have to keep to a general level. Much of Aquinas's teaching, of course, is inherited from the tradition.⁶⁹ But, apart from the authority of the tradition, Aquinas points to God's desire to manifest his goodness in creation. According to Aquinas, one of God's motives in creating is to show forth his goodness.⁷⁰ Given this motivation, and the fact that creatures cannot perfectly manifest God's goodness because in him it is one and undivided, and so must display it in a multiplicity of ways, in respect to human beings, some must display it as mercy while others must display it as justice. 'God wills to manifest his goodness in men; in respect to those whom he predestines, by means of his mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of his justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others.'⁷¹ Aquinas sees St. Paul thinking along these lines: 'To this the Apostle refers, saying in Romans 9: "What if God, willing to show his wrath" – that is, the vengeance of his justice – "and to make his power known, endured" – that is, permitted – "with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction; that he might show the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he has prepared for glory." And 2 Timothy 2 says: "But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver; but also of wood and of earth; and some, indeed, for honor, but some for dishonor." But why he chooses some for glory, and reprobates others, has no reason, except the divine will.'⁷² This last line might confuse some readers. Has Aquinas not just said that the reason behind predestination and reprobation is God's desire to manifest his goodness in creation? Why does he then go on to say that these have no reason except the divine will? The explanation is obvious. The reason for any of God's actions cannot ultimately be anything outside God (as we saw in the previous paragraph) but must reside in God himself. As perfection itself, God needs nothing beyond himself and thus nothing outside him can be a decisive factor in what he does.⁷³ Although God may desire to manifest his goodness, he is not compelled to do so by any external factor. Ultimately, God decides to create because it is his good pleasure.⁷⁴

V. CHRIST AND HOPING FOR ALL

Up until now we have said nothing of the role Christ plays, or might play, in Aquinas's thought with respect to our question. Since what we are talking about concerns man's salvation, certainly Christ must have an important part. Balthasar's treatment of Aquinas on hoping for all surprisingly makes no mention of how Aquinas might see Christ figuring in this hope. Nevertheless, for the sake of thoroughness we should consider how Aquinas's teaching on Christ's salvific work relates to our discussion.⁷⁵

Aquinas believes that it is through Christ that we receive the theological virtues of charity and hope that, as we have seen, are necessary for us to be able to hope for ourselves and others.⁷⁶ And we can hope for ourselves and others not only through having the virtue of hope but because Christ made salvation possible for men.⁷⁷ So, we can say that for Aquinas, without the salvific work of Christ, hope would not be possible, whether for myself or others.

But Aquinas's doctrine of predestination and reprobation returns again in his soteriology. According to Aquinas, we are saved insofar as we are incorporated in Christ, we become his body and he our head: as the power and movement of the members comes from the head, so the grace of salvation comes to us from Christ.⁷⁸ Christ is the head of the whole Church and the head of all people.⁷⁹ But not all people, Aquinas says, are or will be perfectly incorporated in Christ, and so not all people will be saved.

We must therefore consider the members of the mystical body not only as they are in act, but as they are in potentiality. Nevertheless, there are some who are in potentiality who will never be reduced to act, and some are reduced at some time to act; and this according to three classes, of which the first is by faith, the second by the charity of this life, the third by the fruition of the life to come. Hence we must say that if we take the whole time of the world in general, Christ is the head of all men, but diversely. For, first and principally, he is the head of such as are united to him by glory; secondly, of those who are actually united to him by charity; thirdly, of those who are actually united to him by faith; fourthly, of those who are united to him merely in potentiality, which is not yet reduced to act, yet will be reduced to act according to divine predestination; fifthly, of those who are united to him in potentiality, which will never be reduced to act; such are those men existing in the world, who are not predestined, who, however, on their departure from this world, wholly cease to be members of Christ, as being no longer in potentiality to be united to Christ.⁸⁰

While Christ's salvific work makes salvation possible for us, not all of us will be saved. All people are united to Christ either actually or potentially. Among those who are potentially united to Christ, the potentiality of some will not be actualized. Aquinas presents this as a certainty in the above passage. The potentiality that these people have to be incorporated in Christ will never be actualized, Aquinas explains, because they are those 'who are not predestined' ('qui non sunt praedestinati'). These latter are those whom God has chosen to be among the reprobate.

Aquinas makes a similar point but in different terms in his Commentary on 1 Timothy in a discussion of St. Paul's statement about God's will to save all people. There Aquinas contends that Christ's propitiation for our sin (1 John 2:2) is *sufficient* for all but *efficacious* only for some: '[Christ] is the propitiation for our sin': for some efficaciously, but for all sufficiently, for the price of his blood is sufficient for the salvation of all. But, because of an impediment, it is only efficacious in the elect.⁸¹ For Aquinas, election entails predestination.⁸² Not to be among the elect, then, is to be among the reprobate.⁸³ So, Aquinas is saying in this passage from his Commentary on 1 Timothy that, yes, Christ did die for all people, and therefore it is possible in principle for all people to be saved through Christ's death. But *in fact* there will be some people for whom this deed will not prove salvifically efficacious. It will not bring them to salvation because God has decided to exclude them from the predestined.

What Aquinas teaches about Christ's role in our salvation does nothing substantially to alter what he teaches about predestination and reprobation. We see that the same teaching is merely repeated in a different context. Admittedly, we did not descend into all the particulars of Aquinas's soteriology but this was not necessary since we have already been able to see where it is heading at a more general level.

VI. HOPING FOR ALL AND REPROBATION

Assuredly, there is much more that could be discussed in regard to Aquinas's doctrine of predestination and reprobation, but I think that the foregoing remarks should be sufficient for the purposes of this paper. Focusing in particular on what Aquinas tells us about reprobation, we must ask how this relates to my thesis about a duty to hope for the salvation of all people in Aquinas. At first blush it would appear that we are dealing with two 'contraries' in the technical sense of the term. It would seem that a duty to hope for all and a belief that some people will in fact be damned cannot simultaneously be affirmed. Certainly it is the very nature of hope that makes this so. As we saw earlier, hope, although it is about something difficult, is also about something that is possible. Hope is a confident expectation that something difficult to achieve will be achieved. If it is a *fact* that certain people will be damned, then it is not possible to hope for them – we cannot confidently expect that they will be saved – and therefore it is not possible to hope for all people. We can want or wish them to be saved but we cannot *hope* for their salvation, much less have a duty in this respect.⁸⁴ Analogously, I could wish that money grew on trees or that water were wine, but I could not hope for these things.

What all of this would seem to indicate is a tension or even a lack of coherence in Aquinas's eschatology on the points at issue. Certain things about hope and charity that he affirms lead, on the face of it, to a duty to hope for all. But his doctrine of reprobation cannot allow for this sort of hope. For the sake of coherence, therefore, it would appear necessary either to show that the conflict is only apparent and can be resolved or give up the duty to hope for all or the doctrine of reprobation. It goes without saying that this problem cannot be dealt with by the mere denial that the duty to hope for all is not expressly taught by Aquinas, seeing that my claim does not depend on this being the case but only on the duty in question being necessarily implied by other things that Aquinas did expressly teach.

In what follows I will consider several different ways to resolve this conflict in Aquinas's eschatology. I am certain that these approaches do not exhaust the possibilities but they do strike me as some of the more manifest possibilities and, in any case, the limits of this paper do not permit me to consider every option. We will see that three of these approaches are capable of resolving the conflict but, of those three, only one seems to be truly suited to Aquinas's thought.

(1) One possible route to resolving the conflict might be to invoke again the Damascene distinction. It could be argued, for instance, that just as God antecedently wills that all be saved but consequently wills that some be damned, we could hope for all according to God's antecedent will but not according to his consequent will.

There may be something to this argument but I fail to see how it could really succeed. Aquinas believes that some people will in fact be damned and tells us, as we saw a moment ago, that this is not changed by any appeal to God's antecedent will. Hoping for their salvation would be illusory because their damnation is an absolute certainty. It would mean hoping for what simply *cannot* be hoped for. Indeed, we could want or wish for them to be saved but we could not confidently expect it.

(2) Another possibility for resolving the conflict might be to argue that Aquinas grants that God is not bound to any particular economy of salvation, which we can gather from, among other things, Aquinas's admission that Christ's Passion was not the only possible means of delivering us from sin.⁸⁵ It would seem plausible that in another economy God could have decided to save all people. In light of this, would we not have to concede that the salvation of all people is a possibility for Aquinas and as such can be the object of hope?

I am happy to agree that God could have devised a different economy of salvation, as in like manner he could have created a different universe,⁸⁶ with the proviso that in both cases the limit

is set at that which is a contradiction in terms, for such a state of affairs is not an option for divine power or any power.⁸⁷ And I would also agree that an economy in which the salvation of all is a real possibility would not in the least be an instance of a contradiction in terms. Nevertheless, we have to reckon with Aquinas's contention – with which I concur – about the irreversibility of divine providence. Once God has decided on a particular course of action, there is no going back, so to say.⁸⁸ In *this* economy of salvation, or so Aquinas instructs us, God has decided that some people *will* be damned. Hence, as Aquinas envisions it, in *this* economy of salvation hope for all would again be illusory. So, we cannot look to God's freedom in regard to different economies of salvation to resolve the conflict we have on our hands.

(3) But there are still other approaches that we could try. We might ask whether, for Aquinas, there could be other ways of understanding 'all' when we read those Scripture passages upon which the hope for all is based. Consider the following: Aquinas suggests that there are three ways of interpreting St. Paul's assertion in 1 Tim. 2:4 – the principal of such passages – about God's will to save all.⁸⁹ First it could be interpreted according to a 'restricted application, in which case it would mean, as Augustine says, "God wills all men to be saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom he does not wish saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation he does not will".⁹⁰ Secondly, Aquinas says, the assertion 'can be understood as applying to every class of individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case it would mean that God wills some men of every class and condition to be saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of every condition.'⁹¹ Lastly, following the Damascenean distinction, Aquinas observes that it might be taken to apply to God's antecedent will but not his consequent will.

I have just shown that we cannot hope for all according to God's antecedent will since this will does not make the salvation of all a real possibility. But could it not be the case that Aquinas understands the 'all' whom God wills to be saved by his antecedent will according to one of the first two of the above qualifications? Yes, this *could* be the case, but it is rather unlikely. If Aquinas did understand it in this way, then he would not have proposed the Damascenean distinction as a third possibility. Furthermore, if 'all' were not already taken literally in respect to the antecedent will, then there would be no need to invoke the consequent will to explain why all are not in fact predestined. So, clearly we can drop the third interpretation. It will not provide a meaning of 'all' that will allow us both to hope for all and accept Aquinas's teaching on reprobation.

If we apply the first two ways of understanding 'all' to a duty to hope for all, then I think that we have a couple of avenues for resolving the conflict. Hoping for all could mean either just hoping that those who are saved will be saved, or hoping that people from every different natural and social grouping will be saved. This would be a hope for all that would be compatible with the certainty that some will be damned.

But when Aquinas presents various ways of understanding a proposition he does not always agree with each way or, although he may find a given understanding legitimate, he does not always adopt it himself. If we look across his corpus, when Aquinas treats of God's universal salvific will, he typically prefers to apply the Damascenean distinction to it rather than apply these other two qualifications. And yet, in his Commentary on 1 Timothy, Aquinas says of the second qualification that it seems to best capture St. Paul's intention in 2:4.⁹² Still, it is not a qualification that Aquinas himself seems to make much use of in the relevant context. So, we are left with two ways of resolving the conflict between the duty to hope for all and reprobation that, while formally viable, are arguably not very much in the spirit of Aquinas.⁹³

(4) Finally, we might consider looking at hoping for all with an eye to our ignorance of God's designs. What I have in mind is Aquinas's claim that we do not know whom God has

predestined and whom he has reprobated. 'It has been wisely ordained by divine providence,' Aquinas says in the *De Veritate*, 'that men should be ignorant of their predestination or reprobation.'⁹⁴ The reason for this, Aquinas explains, is that knowledge of what God has determined about the fate of an individual could lead to carelessness on the part of the predestined or despair on the part of the reprobate.⁹⁵ It is best, then, for God to keep us in ignorance about what is in store for us. Not knowing what God has decided in regard to any individual (except for Judas, Aquinas might say), could we hope for the salvation of *any* individual and thus 'hope for all' in this sense? This hope would be based more on our ignorance than on God's will. We could grant that not all will be saved, that is, we could accept Aquinas's teaching on reprobation, but because we do not know the destiny of any particular individual, we could hope for each individual that he or she will be saved. Jesus tells the Apostles during the Last Supper, 'Truly, I say to you, one of you will betray me' (Mt. 26:21). Surely it would be possible for any one of the Apostles, say, Peter, to hope for himself and each of his confreres that he is not the traitor? Peter would not be hoping for 'all' the Apostles as a whole but for 'all' inasmuch as he hopes for each individual. In regard to hoping for the salvation of all people, we could then distinguish between, for want of better terminology, a *non-universal* 'hope for all' – which is what we are discussing here – and a *universal* 'hope for all' – which is what Balthasar proposes. In other words, the logical 'extension' of Aquinas's and Balthasar's 'hope for all people' would differ. The extension of Aquinas's 'hope for all people' would be each individual man and woman, but not all men as a unit; whereas the extension of Balthasar's hope is the unit of all people.

There are three other texts of Aquinas that, while they do not treat specifically of hope, might further corroborate the compatibility of this non-universal 'hope for all' with Aquinas's thought. In the Commentary on the *Sentences* Aquinas tells us that 'those who have charity desire the eternal salvation of all in an absolute sense since they do not have knowledge of the conditions – which are known to God – of those who are outside the order of salvation.'⁹⁶ And in the *De Caritate* Aquinas declares that 'we ought to wish eternal life for those who are not yet known to be damned. This foreknowledge is not given to us, and the foreknowledge of God does not exclude the possibility of their attaining eternal life.'⁹⁷ Lastly, in his Commentary on 1 Timothy, in his reflections on 2:4, Aquinas says that 'God makes all his saints will that all be saved' for 'to will this ought to be in the saints since they do not know who is predestined and who is not.'⁹⁸ In the extracts from the Commentaries on the *Sentences* and on 1 Timothy we see that Aquinas, too, uses 'all' in what I am calling the non-universal sense. If we do not know what will become of any particular individual, it certainly seems possible to hope for 'all' in this non-universal sense. I would say that a duty to hope for all in this sense is the best solution to the apparent conflict in Aquinas's eschatology because it appears to follow the most naturally from Aquinas's manner of thinking.

VII. WHAT MAY WE HOPE?

I began this paper with an analysis of Balthasar's reading of Aquinas on the topic of hope for all. Balthasar sees Aquinas as a turning point in the history of theology because of his challenge to the supposedly Augustinian view that hope can only be self-oriented and not other-oriented. Aquinas's argument for the possibility of hoping for others logically opens up the possibility of hoping for the salvation of all people. Balthasar believes that while there may be some gestures in the direction of this latter sort of hope in Aquinas, it is ultimately prevented by Aquinas's teaching on reprobation.

I have sought to go more deeply into Aquinas's texts than Balthasar does in his inquiry. I think that this has allowed us some important insights. We have seen that not only is there a possibility of hoping for others in Aquinas but that a duty to hope for others can be extracted as well. Moreover, we have seen that a possibility and duty to hope for all can be found in Aquinas. Yet if Aquinas's eschatology is to retain its coherence, this duty to hope for all has to be reconciled with his doctrine of reprobation. The only way that this appears to be possible is to understand the 'all' for whom we must hope as what I have called – awkwardly but intelligibly, I believe – a non-universal all.

This non-universal hope for all might satisfy some Thomists but it will probably satisfy few Balthasarians.⁹⁹ One of the questions that those Thomists who are attracted to Balthasar's position but who are still hesitant to adopt it will have to ask themselves is how much of Aquinas's teaching on reprobation they are willing to accept. But those Thomists who reject Balthasar's position should also question themselves about Aquinas's teaching on reprobation. If they do not accept it or would revise it, would that open the door to a hope for all in the universal sense? If they do accept his teaching on reprobation, then evidently they can still consistently reject Balthasar's position. But then there is always the nagging question about whether this teaching on reprobation is only a more subtle form of double predestination.¹⁰⁰ At any rate, we can see that much of the future discussion will have to take up the issue of reprobation and consider it in a more thorough way than I have been able to do here.¹⁰¹

Notes

1 *Dare We Hope that All Men be Saved?* trans. D. Kipp and L. Krauth (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988), pp. 73–84; *A Short Discourse on Hell*, trans. D. Kipp and L. Krauth (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988), pp. 211–221. Cf. *Love Alone*, trans. A. Dru (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969), pp. 78–80; *Theo-Drama* vol. V, *The Last Act*, trans. G. Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1998), p. 317. *Dare We Hope?* and *A Short Discourse on Hell* are actually included in the same volume in the English edition. But since Balthasar wrote them as independent works, I will be citing them separately.

2 *Dare We Hope?* pp. 73–84; *A Short Discourse on Hell*, pp. 211–221.

3 *Dare We Hope*, pp. 13–28, 44–6, 84, 140–2; *A Short Discourse on Hell*, pp. 163–6, 186–7, 196–7, 210; cf. *Theo-Drama*, vol. V, pp. 316–7.

4 Balthasar sees Karl Barth, for example, tending to make the salvation of all men a matter of certainty rather than hope (cf. *A Short Discourse on Hell*, pp. 196–7).

5 'The Inflated Reputation of Hans Urs von Balthasar,' *New Oxford Review* 67 (2000): 17. Emphasis in original text.

6 As evidence that it is a *de fide* teaching of the Church that not all will be saved, for instance, some appeal to the pronouncements of the ninth century councils at Quiersy and Valence. But the doctrinal authority of these councils is uncertain, especially given the fact that they were not ecumenical but local councils and that the gathering at Valence was convoked against the one at Quiersy. This has been noted by W.G. Most. Cf. *Grace, Predestination, and the Salvific Will of God* (Front Royal: Christendom Press, 1997), p. 41. As local councils, Most argues, the teachings of Quiersy and Valence 'lack definitive dogmatic weight' (41). This is also acknowledged by Denzinger despite his inclusion of the decrees of these councils in his *Enchiridion* (Cf. *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, 31st ed. [Barcelona: Herder, 1958], pp. v–vi).

7 Cf. *Dare We Hope?* pp. 29–46, 97–113; *A Short Discourse on Hell*, pp. 177–187, 211–221.

8 *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, §1821.

9 'La Chiesa e la Salvezza,' *La Civiltà Cattolica* 3720 (June 18, 2005): 542.

10 Like Hercsik and others, I happen to think that Balthasar's views are within the bounds of Christian orthodoxy, at least as these are determined by the Catholic Church. Of course, members of Christian confessions influenced by teachings like Calvin's on double predestination might think otherwise.

11 Cf. *Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum*, III, 26, 2, 5, 4 expos. text.; *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, 17, 3; *Quaestio Disputata de Spe*, 4.

12 Emphasis added. *Enchiridion de Fide, Spe, et Caritate*, 8.

13 *Dare We Hope?* p. 74. Cf. J.-G. Bougerol, *La théologie de l'espérance aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, vol. I: *Études* (Paris: *Études Augustiniennes*, 1985), p. 287: 'St. Augustine had, in effect, claimed, in the *Enchiridion*, that one can only hope for himself, and after Augustine no one dared to cast doubt on this proposition.' That is, no one dared until Aquinas, Bougerol claims. Not everyone has agreed that Augustine completely denied the possibility of hoping for others. On this controversy, besides the work of Bougerol, see: P. Charles, 'Spes Christi', *Nouvelle Revue Théologique* 61 (1934), 1009–1021; 64 (1937): 1057–1075; S. Pinckaers, 'Peut-on espérer pour les autres?' *Mélanges de Science Religieuse* 16 (1959), 31–46; W.E. Mann, 'Hope' in E. Stump (ed.), *Reasoned Faith: Essays in Philosophical Theology in Honor of Norman Kretzmann* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 251–280; T.J. van Bavel, 'Hoffen für andere bei Augustinus' in A. Zumkeller and A. Krummel (eds.), *Traditio Augustiniana: Studien über Augustinus und seiner Rezeption: Festgabe für Willigis Eckermann, O.S.A. zum 60. Geburtstag* (Würzburg: Augustinus Verlag, 1994), pp. 19–37.

14 *Dare We Hope?* p. 75.

15 *Theo-drama*, V, p. 317.

16 *ST* II-II, 108, 1.

17 Cf. *La théologie de l'espérance*, pp. 287–9.

18 *Dare We Hope?* pp. 77–8.

19 See, for example, *ST* I, 23, 1–3.

20 In comparing Aquinas's theology with John Milbank's, Hans Boersma, for example, has no problem with attributing a doctrine of double predestination to Aquinas despite Aquinas's careful avoidance of that language and later Thomists' rejection of the charge. See Boersma's 'Atonement as the Ecclesio-Christological Practice of Forgiveness in John Milbank' in J.K.A. Smith and J. Olthuis (eds.), *Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed Tradition: Creation, Covenant, and Predestination* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2005), pp. 183–204, in particular p. 198. See also L. Ott, *Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma*, trans. P. Lynch (Rockford: Tan, 1960), p. 245. While I tend to believe that Aquinas avoids any form of double predestination in his theology, this is a very thorny issue and I do not have the space in this paper to address the question with the care it deserves.

21 1 Tim. 2:4.

22 *Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum*, I, 46, 1, 1; *Quaestio disputata de veritate*, 23, 2; 28, 3; *Super I ad Corinthios*, 7, 1; *Super I Timotheo*, 2, 1; *ST* I, 19, 6, ad 1; Cf. *ST* Suppl., 72, 3.

23 *ST* I, 19, 6, ad 1: 'Deus antecedenter vult omnem hominem salvari; sed consequenter vult quosdam damnari, secundum exigentiam suae iustitiae.' Most of the English translations of the *Summa* that I am using in this paper are those of 1920 translation of the Dominican Fathers of the English Province. I may have used my own translations here and there or altered the Dominican Fathers' translation on occasion.

24 *Dare We Hope?* 32. Cf. K. Rahner, 'Hell' in K. Rahner et al. (eds.) *Sacramentum Mundi*, vol. III (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969), pp. 7–9; 'The Hermeneutics of Eschatological Assertions' in *Theological Investigations*, Vol. IV, trans. K. Smyth (New York: Crossroad, 1982), 323–346. Cf. M. Schmaus, *Dogma 6: Justification and the Last Things* (Kansas City: Sheed and Ward: 1977), pp. 6–7; J.-H. Nicolas, *Synthèse dogmatique: De la Trinité à la Trinité* (Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires, 1985), pp. 618–619.

25 *Dare We Hope?* pp. 29–45; *A Short Discourse on Hell*, pp. 177–187.

26 *Dare We Hope?* pp. 45, 73–84; *A Short Discourse on Hell*, pp. 187, 211–221.

27 *Dare We Hope?* pp. 183–7.

28 This might be the best place to respond to J.-H. Nicolas's claim that both Aquinas's and Balthasar's eschatologies are marked by an inappropriate interest in 'futurology,' that is, they are both (Aquinas in his doctrine of predestination and reprobation and Balthasar in what he says about the duty to hope for all) concerned with pursuing knowledge about the final outcome of divine judgment. Cf. *Synthèse dogmatique: De la Trinité à la Trinité*, pp. 618–619. While their eschatologies do touch on this outcome, it is only incidental to their primary interest, which I take to be the understanding of the teaching of revelation about God's salvific will.

29 *ST* I-II, 40, 1 and 2.

30 *ST* I-II, 40, 1, ad 2; 2, ad 2.

31 R. Cessario sees hope as also having the status of a natural virtue in Aquinas. Cf. 'The Theological Virtue of Hope (IIa IIae, qq. 17–22),' in S.J. Pope (ed.) *The Ethics of Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), pp. 233–4. M.M. Glenn denies that Aquinas places it among the natural virtues. Cf. 'A Comparison of the Thomistic and Scotistic Concepts of Hope,' *The Thomist* 20 (1957): 32.

32 *ST* II-II, 17, 1 and 2. Here I follow P. de Letter's interpretation of Aquinas. Cf. 'Hope and Charity in St. Thomas,' *The Thomist* 13 (1950): 224.

33 *Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum*, III, 26, 2, 5, 4 expos.

34 *Sermo*, 71, 13 (PL, 38, 456).

35 *ST II-II*, 17, 3: '[S]pes potest esse alicuius dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, absolute, et sic est solum boni ardui ad se pertinentis. Alio modo, ex praesuppositione alterius, et sic potest esse etiam eorum quae ad alium pertinent.'

36 *ST II-II*, 17, 3: 'Unio autem est aliquorum distinctorum, et ideo amor directe potest respicere alium, quem sibi aliquis unit per amorem, habens eum sicut seipsum.'

37 *ST II-II*, 17, 3: 'Sed praesupposita unione amoris ad alterum, iam aliquis potest desiderare et sperare aliquid alteri sicut sibi. Et secundum hoc aliquis potest sperare alteri vitam aeternam, inquantum est ei unitus per amorem. Et sicut est eadem virtus caritatis qua quis diligit Deum, seipsum et proximum, ita etiam est eadem virtus spei qua quis sperat sibi ipsi et alii.' It might be argued that Aquinas's apparent departure from Augustine is not all that radical. He has not essentially contradicted the Bishop of Hippo. Aquinas can still say with him that hope is fundamentally selforiented; but through love we can look upon other people as other selves and in this way entertain hope for their salvation as well.

38 This work dates from around roughly the same time as the *Secunda Pars* of the *Summa*. Cf. *Disputed Questions on Virtues*, E.M. Atkins and T. Williams (eds.), trans. E.M. Atkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. ix, xxxi. The English translation of the *De Caritate* that I am using in this paper comes from this edition.

39 *De Spe*, 4, arg. 4: 'Praeterea, spes et desperatio sunt in eodem. Sed desperatio potest esse de alio; unde mandatur nobis de nemine esse desperandum in via. Ergo etiam spes potest esse de aliquo alio.'

40 *Ibid.*, 4, arg. 5: '[E]adem virtute caritatis, homo diligit se et proximum. Ergo eadem virtute spei sperat homo vitam aeternam sibi et aliis; et sic, cum boni sperent vitam aeternam aliis, videtur quod in eis sit virtus spei.'

41 *Ibid.*, 4: 'Ex parte vero sperantis, principale obiectum est quod aliquis beatitudinem speret sibi; secundarium vero est quod speret eam aliis in quantum sunt quodam modo unum cum ipso, et bonum eorum desiderat et sperat sicut et suum.'

42 *ST II-II*, 26, 1–5; *Quaestio disputata de caritate*, 9.

43 Obviously, the charity that we owe to God does not also lead us to hope for God since God already possesses eternal bliss by his very nature.

44 *ST II-II*, 17, 3.

45 *ST II-II*, 22, 1, ad 3: '[D]ebitum est ad humanam salutem ut speret homo de Deo.'

46 *ST II-II*, 22, 1.

47 *ST II-II*, 23, 1, ad 2; 25, 6; 44, 7.

48 *ST I-II*, 100, 10; *II-II*, 25, 4.

49 *ST II-II*, 23, 1, ad 2: '[A]micitia se extendit ad aliquem dupliciter. Uno modo, respectu sui ipsius, et sic amicitia nunquam est nisi ad amicum. Alio modo se extendit ad aliquem respectu alterius personae, sicut, si aliquis habet amicitiam ad aliquem hominem, ratione eius diligit omnes ad illum hominem pertinentes, sive filios sive servos sive qualitercumque ei attinentes. Et tanta potest esse dilectio amici quod propter amicum amantur hi qui ad ipsum pertinent etiam si nos offendant vel odiant. Et hoc modo amicitia caritatis se extendit etiam ad inimicos, quos diligimus ex caritate in ordine ad Deum, ad quem principaliter habetur amicitia caritatis.'

50 *ST II-II*, 25, 7. Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1166a3.

51 *ST II-II*, 25, 3, ad 2 and 3; 25, 6; 26, 6, ad 1.

52 *ST II-II*, 25, 4.

53 *ST II-II*, 31, 2. While Aquinas recognizes that our finitude makes doing good to all a practical impossibility on one level, he points out that, nevertheless, we can pray for all and disposed to do good to anyone if we have the time to spare (*ST II-II*, 31, 2, ad 1).

54 *ST II-II*, 108, 1: '... omnes homines debemus diligere. . . .'

55 *ST II-II*, 26, 6, ad 1: '[O]mnibus optamus bonum idem in genere, scilicet beatitudinem aeternam.' Cf. *De caritate*, 9, 8.

56 *Compendium Theologiae*, II, 4: '[Q]ui patrem Deum confitetur, debet conari ut Dei imitator existat.' The English translation of the *Compendium* that I am using comes mostly from C. Vollert's 1947 translation.

57 *Compendium Theologiae*, II, 5: 'Inter alia vero praecipue qui se Dei filium recognoscit, debet in caritate dominum imitari, secundum illud Ephes. V, 1: "estote imitatores Dei, sicut filii carissimi et ambulate in dilectione." Dei autem dilectio non privata est, sed communis ad omnes: "diligit enim omnia quae sunt," ut dicitur Sap. XI, 25; et specialiter homines, secundum illud Deut. XXXIII, 3: "dilexit populos".' Cf. *Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum*, I, 46, 1, 1, arg. 3: 'Praeterea, voluntas habentis caritatem imitatur voluntatem divinam. Sed habens caritatem, cuiuslibet salutem optat. Ergo videtur quod et Deus omnium salutem velit.'

58 A colleague who read an earlier draft of this paper suggested that I am 'perhaps trying to make the Thomistic notion of a duty to love all others do more work than it is meant to prior to Immanuel Kant.' He also observes that '[d]eontology plays a role in Balthasar that it does not in Aquinas.' In the event that there are readers who have a like concern, I thought it advisable to respond to it here. Let me say first that I am no fan of Kant's deontology nor of any attempt to synthesize it with a Thomistic approach. So, there is no chance that I am consciously trying to sneak Kant into this paper. Whether I have nevertheless done so unwittingly is another matter. But I do not think that it is impossible for Aquinas to say things that sound Kantian. It is not at all unusual to find two thinkers who say things that sound similar no matter how different the two are in other respects. Whatever the case may be, the relevant question is whether what I attribute to Aquinas really is in his texts. We have to look at his texts themselves and not decide a priori that Aquinas simply cannot say anything that sounds like Kant. [Note: this first paragraph was reinstated into this version of the published paper on 16 November 2011, after erroneously having been omitted from the version originally published on 16 September 2011.] I suppose that a notion of duty is 'Kantian' in the popular sense if it rejects teleology as an ethically relevant category, if it is solely determined by a rational agent qua rational agent – and therefore rejects external determinants (God, for example) as heteronomous – and has no place for prudential judgments. Those characteristics seem to me to be what distinguish the Kantian understanding of duty. Now, I think that Aquinas believes that there are certain things that we are obliged to do, that is, we have a duty to do them; among these is the duty to love all men and hope for all men. But in my opinion Aquinas's concept of duty, unlike Kant's, accepts teleology as an ethically relevant category and allows for external determinants and prudential judgments. I admit that I do not make this explicit in the main text of my paper but I do not believe that I say anything there to the contrary either. I hope that my clarification here is enough to convince readers that I am not reading a Kantian deontology into Aquinas.

59 *ST I*, 23, 7, ad 3. And yet in the body of the article Aquinas writes: 'De numero autem omnium praedestinatorum hominum, quis sit, dicunt quidam quod tot ex hominibus salvabuntur, quot Angeli ceciderunt. Quidam vero, quod tot salvabuntur, quot Angeli remanserunt. Quidam vero, quod tot ex hominibus salvabuntur, quot Angeli ceciderunt, et insuper tot, quot fuerunt Angeli creati. Sed melius dicitur quod soli Deo est cognitus numerus electorum in superna felicitate locandus.'

60 *De Veritate*, 6, 2, ad 11.

61 *ST I*, 23, 3.

62 *ST I*, 14, 13; 19, 6–7; 22, 1.

63 For the sake of convenience I will just refer to it as 'the Damascenean distinction.' Damascene discusses this distinction in *De Fide Orthodoxa*, II, 29.

64 *ST I*, 19, 6, ad 1.

65 *De Veritate*, 23, 2: 'Quia ergo Deus omnes homines propter beatitudinem fecit, dicitur voluntate antecedente omnium salutem velle: sed quia quidam suae salutis adversantur, quos ordo suae sapientiae ad salutem venire non patitur propter eorum defectum, implet in eis alio modo id quod ad suam bonitatem pertinet, scilicet eos per iustitiam damnans; ut sic dum a primo ordine voluntatis deficiunt, in secundum labantur; et dum Dei voluntatem non faciunt, impleatur in eis voluntas Dei. Ipse autem defectus peccati, quo aliquis redditur dignus poena in praesenti vel in futuro, non est volitus a Deo neque voluntate antecedente neque consequente; sed est ab eo solummodo permissus. Nec tamen intelligendum est ex praedictis quod intentio Dei frustrari possit: quia istum qui non salvatur, praescivit ab aeterno fore non salvandum; nec ordinat ipsum in salutem secundum ordinem praedestinationis, qui est ordo absolutae voluntatis; sed quantum ex parte sua est, dedit ei naturam ad beatitudinem ordinatam.' The English text of the *De Veritate* I am using comes mostly from R.W. Mulligan's 1954 translation. Cf. *Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum*, I, 46, 1, 1; *De veritate*, 23, 2; 28, 3; *Super 1 ad Corinthios*, 7, 1; *Super 1 Timotheo*, 2, 1; *ST I*, 19, 6, ad 1.

66 William G. Most rejects this reading of Aquinas. See n. 68 below. For evidence in support of my reading, which I think is fairly standard, the reader should turn, for instance, to *De Veritate*, 6, 2. There Aquinas considers the following objection: '[R]eprobation and predestination signify the divine essence while connoting an effect. There is no diversity, however, in the divine essence. Consequently, the difference between predestination and reprobation comes entirely from their effects. Now, effects are considered as caused by us. *It is due to us, as cause, therefore, that the predestined are segregated from the reprobate, as takes place through predestination*' (obj. 4). I have added emphasis to the last line. The objector insists that I, not God, am the one who determines whether I will be among the predestined or reprobate. Here is the Latin text of the objection with emphasis again added to the last line: 'Reprobatio et praedestinatio significant divinam essentiam, et connotant effectum; in essentia autem divina non est aliqua diversitas. Ergo tota diversitas praedestinationis et reprobationis ex effectibus procedit. Effectus autem sunt considerati, ex parte nostra. *Ergo ex parte nostra causa est quod praedestinati a reprobis segregantur, quod per praedestinationem fit.*' Aquinas disagrees. It is God, he

says, who decides who will be among the predestined and the reprobate. Thus, he replies to the objection: '[A]lthough the different formal characters of God's attributes are drawn from the differences in their effects, it does not follow from this that these effects are the cause of his attributes. For the different formal characteristics of his attributes are not derived from our qualities as though our qualities caused them; rather, our qualities are signs that the attributes themselves are causes. *Consequently, it does not follow that that which comes from us is the reason why one man is reprobated and another predestined.*' Again, I have added the emphasis. Here is the Latin text of Aquinas's reply: '[Q]uod quamvis secundum diversitatem effectuum sumatur diversa ratio attributorum divinatorum, non tamen propter hoc sequitur quod effectus sint attributorum divinatorum causae: non enim hoc modo accipiuntur rationes attributorum secundum ea quae in nobis sunt, sicut secundum causas, sed magis sicut secundum signa quaedam causarum; *et ideo non sequitur quod ea quae ex parte nostra sunt, sint causa quare unus reprobetur et alius praedestinetur.*' Cf. *ST I*, 23, 5, ad 3. See footnote 68 below for further discussion of the issues raised in these texts.

67 *ST I*, 23, 5; 19, 5.

68 *ST I*, 19, 8; 83, 1, ad 3; I-II, 10, 4; *In peri hermeneias*, I, 14. Aquinas's position on the relationship between divine foreknowledge, predestination, reprobation, and free will, of course, is quite complex and controversial and here I only present the broad outline. A more thorough discussion would not be irrelevant to the topic of this paper but my main interest in the paper is to show the problem that Aquinas's certainty about some people being reprobated poses for any hope for universal human salvation in Aquinas's thought. This matter can be dealt with independently of the other issues.

Nevertheless, for those interested in the relationship between divine foreknowledge, predestination, reprobation, and free will in Aquinas, there are helpful accounts in Brian Davies, *The Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), pp. 166–169; 174–178; 262–269; and Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, *Predestination*, trans. B. Rose (St. Louis: Herder, 1939), pp. 70–106. I am not certain that I agree with all the points of M. John Farrelly's treatment of Aquinas on these issues but I do believe his conclusion is correct: 'It is clear,' he writes, that Aquinas 'held that absolute predestination was causally antecedent to God's foreknowledge of man's merits, and eternal reprobation was likewise antecedent to man's personal sins' (*Predestination, Grace, and Free Will* [Westminster: The Newman Press, 1964], p. 121). William G. Most rejects in part the reading of Aquinas that I present. It seems to me that the authors I have mentioned – Davies, Garrigou-Lagrange, Farrelly – all accept this reading although they might not concur on certain finer points. On Most's interpretation of Aquinas, '[n]o reprobation, either positive or negative, is decreed before consideration of personal demerits. It is only decreed after and because of foreseen resistance to grace' and '[p]redestination is decreed for all in whom this grave resistance is not found. It is not clear from the words of St. Thomas whether it is decreed after consideration of merits, or before merits but after the consideration of the absence of grave resistance. More probably he would have preferred to put it before consideration of merits' (*Grace, Predestination, and the Salvific Will of God*, p. 337).

69 For a brief discussion of the influences on Aquinas's teaching on predestination and reprobation, see Ian Hislop, 'Introduction' in *Summa Theologiae*, vol. 5 (1a. 19–26), *God's Will and Providence* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), pp. xx–xxiii.

70 *ST I*, 23, 5, ad 3.

71 *ST I*, 23, 5, ad 3: 'Voluit igitur Deus in hominibus, quantum ad aliquos, quos praedestinat, suam repraesentare bonitatem per modum misericordiae, parcendo; et quantum ad aliquos, quos reprobat, per modum iustitiae, puniendo. Et haec est ratio quare Deus quosdam eligit, et quosdam reprobat.' Cf. *Super Romanos*, 9, 4.

72 *ST I*, 23, 5, ad 3: 'Et hanc causam assignat apostolus, ad Rom. IX, dicens, volens Deus ostendere iram (idest vindictam iustitiae), et notam facere potentiam suam, sustinuit (idest permisit) 'in multa patientia, vasa irae apta in interitum, ut ostenderet divitias gloriae suae in vasa misericordiae, quae praeparavit in gloriam.' Et II Tim. II dicit, 'in magna autem domo non solum sunt vasa aurea et argentea, sed etiam lignea et fictilia; et quaedam quidem in honorem, quaedam in contumeliam.' Sed quare hos elegit in gloriam, et illos reprobavit, non habet rationem nisi divinam voluntatem.' Cf. *Super Romanos*, 9, 4.

73 See, for example, *ST I*, 19, 3.

74 *ST I*, 19, 4.

75 A colleague who read an earlier draft of this paper has suggested that I should take into account what Aquinas says in *ST III*, 8, 3 about Christ's universal headship and in particular 'the notion of universal potential headship.' 'This idea in Aquinas,' my colleague added, 'plays a role analogous to that of Balthasar's universal hope.' Since it is possible that other readers will think similarly, I have decided to follow this advice. But, as I

show, there is nothing in *ST* III, 8, 3 that brings Aquinas any closer to Balthasar's position. If there is an analogy between what Aquinas says in *ST* III, 8, 3 and Balthasar's teaching on hoping for the salvation of all men, it seems so distant as to be unrecognizable.

76 *ST* I-II, 62, 1.

77 *ST* III, 46, 3.

78 *ST* III, 8, 1. For an excellent treatment of these issues see E. Sauras, 'Thomistic Soteriology and the Mystical Body', *The Thomist* 15 (1952), 543–571.

79 *ST* III, 8, 1; 3.

80 *ST* III, 8, 3: 'Sic igitur membra corporis mystici non solum accipiuntur secundum quod sunt in actu, sed etiam secundum quod sunt in potentia. Quaedam tamen sunt in potentia quae nunquam reducuntur ad actum, quaedam vero quae quandoque reducuntur ad actum, secundum hunc triplicem gradum, quorum unus est per fidem, secundus per caritatem viae, tertius per fruitionem patriae. Sic ergo dicendum est quod, accipiendo generaliter secundum totum tempus mundi, Christus est caput omnium hominum, sed secundum diversos gradus. Primo enim et principaliter est caput eorum qui actu uniuntur sibi per gloriam. Secundo, eorum qui actu uniuntur sibi per caritatem. Tertio, eorum qui actu uniuntur sibi per fidem. Quarto vero, eorum qui sibi uniuntur solum potentia nondum ad actum reducta, quae tamen est ad actum reducenda, secundum divinam praedestinationem. Quinto vero, eorum qui in potentia sibi sunt uniti quae nunquam reducetur ad actum, sicut homines in hoc mundo viventes qui non sunt praedestinati. Qui tamen, ex hoc mundo recedentes, totaliter desinunt esse membra Christi, quia iam nec sunt in potentia ut Christo uniantur.'

81 "[I]pse est propitiatio pro peccatis nostris," pro aliquibus efficaciter, sed pro omnibus sufficienter, quia pretium sanguinis eius est sufficiens ad salutem omnium: sed non habet efficaciam nisi in electis propter impedimentum' (2, 1).

82 Cf. *ST* I, 23, 4.

83 Cf. *De Veritate*, 6, 1, especially Aquinas's response to contrary difficulty 5.

84 Discussing the object of hope in the *Compendium Theologiae*, Aquinas says that what we hope for 'possibile esse aestimetur ad consequendum, et hoc spes supra desiderium addit: potest enim homo desiderare etiam ea quae non aestimat se posse adipisci, sed horum spes esse non potest' (II, 7).

85 *ST* III, 46, 2.

86 See, for example, *ST* I, 25, 5–6.

87 See, for example, *ST* I, 25, 3.

88 Indeed, after Aquinas acknowledges that God could have chosen another way to deliver us than through Christ's Passion, he is quick to add that if we suppose that God has in fact decided on the Passion as the instrument, then this will infallibly be the means that God uses. Thus, he writes: 'Sed ex aliqua suppositione facta, fuit impossibile. Quia enim impossibile est Dei praescientiam falli et eius voluntatem sive dispositionem cassari, supposita praescientia et praeordinatione Dei de passione Christi, non erat simul possibile Christum non pati, et hominem alio modo quam per eius passionem liberari. Et est eadem ratio de omnibus his quae sunt praescita et praeordinata a Deo, ut in prima parte habitum est' (*ST* III, 46, 2). This last statement – 'Et est eadem ratio de omnibus his quae sunt praescita et praeordinata a Deo' – of course, covers our particular question.

89 *ST* 19, 6, ad 1. Cf. *Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum*, I, 46, 1, 1, ad 1. In his Commentary on 1 Timothy Aquinas lists four ways of understanding 2:4. The first we will discuss shortly, the other three correspond to the three we are treating here. Cf. *Super 1 Timotheo*, 2, 1.

90 *ST* 19, 6, ad 1: 'Uno modo, ut sit accommodata distributio, secundum hunc sensum, "Deus vult salvos fieri omnes homines qui salvantur, non quia nullus homo sit quem salvum fieri non velit, sed quia nullus salvus fit, quem non velit salvum fieri," ut dicit Augustinus.'

91 *ST* 19, 6, ad 1: '... secundo potest intelligi, ut fiat distributio pro generibus singulorum, et non pro singulis generum, secundum hunc sensum, Deus vult de quolibet statu hominum salvos fieri, mares et feminas, Iudaeos et gentiles, parvos et magnos; non tamen omnes de singulis statibus.' Aquinas does not mention it here but this is another way that Augustine proposes of construing St. Paul's text. Cf. Augustine's *De Correptione et Gratia*, 44.

92 *Super 1 Timotheo*, 2, 1.

93 Incidentally, some modern exegetes reject the sort qualifications of 1 Tim. 2:4 proposed by Augustine, contending instead that 'all' must be understood literally. See, for example, C. Spicq, *Saint Paul: Les Épîtres Pastorales* (Paris: J. Gabalda, 1947), p. 58; P. de Ambroggi, *Le Epistole Pastorale di S. Paolo a Timoteo e Tito* (Milano: Marietti, 1953), p. 122; J.N.D. Kelly, *The Pastoral Epistles* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 62; *Early Christian Doctrines*, 4th ed. (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1968), pp. 368–9; G.T. Montague, *First and Second Timothy* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), pp. 53–4. Spicq and de Ambroggi both endorse the application of the Damascenean distinction to this passage.

94 *De Veritate*, 6, 5: 'Et propter hoc a divina providentia salubriter est ordinatum ut homines suam praedestinationem vel reprobationem ignorent.' Cf. *ST I*, 23, 1, ad 4; *Super Ioannem*, 10, 5; *De Caritate*, 8, ad 9.

95 *De veritate*, 6, 5; *ST I*, 23, 1, ad 4; *Super Ioannem*, 10, 5.

96 *Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum*, I, 46, 1, 1, ad 3: '[Q]uod habens caritatem, optat omnibus salutem aeternam absolute, eo quod cognitioni suae non subjacent conditiones quibus a salute aliquis deordinatur, quae divinae cognitioni subjacent.'

97 *De Caritate*, 8, ad 9: 'Praescitos autem nondum damnatos debemus diligere ad vitam aeternam habendam; quia hoc nobis non constat, et praescientia divina ab eis non excludit possibilitatem perveniendi ad vitam aeternam.'

98 *Super 1 Timotheo*, 2, 1: 'Deus . . . facit suos sanctos velle quod omnes salvi fiant. Hoc velle enim debet esse in sanctis, quia nesciunt qui sunt praedestinati, et qui non.'

99 Balthasar himself finds a similar position, advocated by G. Hermes, unsatisfactory. Cf. *Dare We Hope?* p. 20.

100 See note 20, above.

101 A much shorter version of this paper was presented at the International Congress on Medieval Studies at Western Michigan University in May of 2009 in a session sponsored by the Center for Thomistic Studies of the University of St. Thomas in Houston and the University of St. Thomas in St. Paul. I am grateful to R.E. Houser and John Boyle for accepting it to be presented in that forum and thus giving me the opportunity to reflect more deeply on this topic. I am also grateful to several people for their comments on that draft and a subsequent draft prepared that Summer: Thomas M. Osborne, Mary Catherine Sommers, Jacques Servais, S.J., Joseph D. Fessio, S.J., Brian Davies, O.P., Steven A. Long, James Jacobs, Roger Nutt, D.C. Schindler, Barry David, and Cyrus Olsen. I would also like to thank Henry Stachyra for his help with researching Church councils. Any shortcomings in this paper are, of course, my own.