DIVINE ENERGIES OR DIVINE PERSONHOOD: VLADIMIR LOSSKY AND JOHN ZIZIOULAS ON CONCEIVING THE TRANSCENDENT AND IMMANENT GOD

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Introduction

Contemporary Orthodox Christian theology, and perhaps even the Eastern Christian tradition in general, has almost become identified with the soteriological and mystical notion of “deification” or theosis. One cannot think of theosis, however, without reference to the Orthodox Christian understanding of “energies”. The centrality of the realism of God’s energies for deification—i.e., that God’s energies are truly God—is affirmed by virtually every contemporary Orthodox Christian theologian. These theologians would also add that the concept of the “energies” of God functions as the interpretive key to the Greek patristic tradition. The Greek fathers affirmed from the beginning a distinction between God’s unknowable essence and God’s energies through which a real communion with God is possible. This distinction would receive clarification throughout the centuries culminating in the writings of the last great Byzantine theologian, Gregory Palamas. At the heart then of the Orthodox Christian tradition, and what separates it from other Christian traditions, is the notion of deification through the “energies” of God, which are God. Vladimir Lossky, the Russian émigré theologian, played no small part in constructing this narrative, beginning with his early writings on Dionysius the Areopagite, but especially with his well known and widely read The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, first published in 1944.
There is, however, one contemporary Orthodox theologian who has not joined the consensus of his colleagues in affirming the centrality of the concept of “energies” for the Orthodox understanding of deification. For John Zizioulas, theosis is not about participating in the “energies” of God but in the hypostasis of Christ. While the notion of “energies” is useful and necessary in understanding a more general relationship between God and creation, salvation in Christ, i.e., deification, can only be expressed in terms of the category hypostasis, or “person”—or so says Zizioulas.

This essay will explore the differences between John Zizioulas’s and Vladimir Lossky’s understandings of salvation or theosis. Although Zizioulas could be compared to many Orthodox theologians who affirm with Lossky the centrality of the concept of God’s “energies”, the focus on Lossky is primarily due to Zizioulas himself attributing to Lossky a certain influence in determining the shape of contemporary Orthodox theology. Zizioulas’s own attempts to understand salvation in terms of an ontology of personhood is developed, in part, over and against Lossky’s emphasis on apophaticism and the related notion of God’s energies. The first two parts of this essay will attempt to make transparent the logic behind the theologies of Lossky and Zizioulas. The final part of the essay will attempt to account for the differences and make a judgment regarding the adequacy of their theologies on the basis of internal coherency.

The implications of this debate extend beyond the possibility of a paradigm shift in Orthodox theology with Zizioulas’s ontology of personhood. Insofar as the Orthodox notion of theosis attempts to convey a real communion with the Triune God, the debate between Lossky and Zizioulas is about how to adequately conceive of God as immanent and transcendent. In this sense, its significance expands to encompass the recent discussions on the revival of trinitarian theology.

Vladimir Lossky: Apophaticism and the “Energies” of God

For Vladimir Lossky, theology begins with the revelation of God. This revelation is not simply that which God gives in the act of creation, but the revelation, which for Lossky is the Incarnation in Jesus Christ. The Incarnation reveals who God is, i.e., God as Trinity and as such “forms the basis of all Christian theology; it is indeed, theology itself, in the sense in which that word was understood by the Greek fathers, for whom theology most commonly stood for the mystery of the Trinity revealed to the Church.”¹ The Incarnation reveals God as Trinity as “a primordial fact”,² i.e., a word or proclamation about God’s being. As such, it is what makes “theology possible”.³

The Incarnation, however, does more than simply communicate a particular “fact” or piece of information about God. As the event of divine-human communion, it makes possible the human ascent toward union with the
living God. The true goal of theology, knowledge of God, is not abstract ideas, but an encounter of mystical union with the personal God. The Incarnation makes possible knowledge of God not as gnosis, an intellectual knowledge, but as “mystical experience” which lies beyond thought. Although the Incarnation may reveal the Trinity as a “primordial fact”, “to know the mystery of the Trinity in its fullness is to enter into perfect union with God and to attain to deification of the human creature”.

As the event of divine-human communion which enables the human ascent to union with God, the Incarnation reveals not simply that God is Trinity as a “primordial fact”, but a God who is both transcendent to and immanent in created existence. The Incarnation is the event of real communion, such that the created human nature in Christ is deified through participation in God’s life. This participation is in God’s energies, which is to be distinguished from God’s essence. The latter refers to the transcendence of God, God’s radical otherness from created existence. God’s essence is ontologically distinct from created being, and it is only in and through the revelation that God’s transcendence as ontologically other is known. “For outside revelation nothing is known of the difference between created and the uncreated, of creation ex nihilo, of the abyss which has to be crossed between the creature and Creator.” The Incarnation reveals the distinction between the uncreated, unknowable essence of God that lies beyond being, and created essence whose existence is identified with being.

The well-known essence/energies distinction within Eastern Orthodox theology is thus an expression of the transcendence and immanence of God revealed in the incarnation, the energies being the bridge of the unfathomable gap between the uncreated God and God’s creation. “Implied in the paradox of the Christian revelation: the transcendent God becomes immanent in the world, but in the very immanence of His economy . . . He reveals Himself as transcendent, as ontologically independent of all created being.” The God whose essence is ontologically distinct from created being is unknowable to thought, which is inherently linked to created being; but such a God is known through participation and union with God’s energies.

Why does Lossky find it necessary to affirm an unknowable essence of God, a God-beyond-being, in order to express the transcendence of God? For Lossky, the essence/energies distinction is the only way to affirm the reality of a personal communion with the living God in freedom and love. The notion of the unknowable essence of God affirms both the freedom of God from created existence and the integrity of created existence. It also expresses a communion between the divine and the human that is based on freedom and not necessity.

The idea of the unknowable essence of God protects against a monistic conception of God which conceives the relationship of God to the world in terms of necessity. Lossky often cites Plotinus and the Sophiology of the Russian theologian Sergius Bulgakov as examples of a monistic idea of God.
The shadow of monism hovers, according to Lossky, even over the God of Thomas Aquinas and scholastic theology. Lossky is aware that for Aquinas there is no necessary link between God and the world, as is suggested in the thought of Plotinus and Bulgakov. Like Bulgakov and Plotinus, Aquinas is guilty in Lossky’s estimation of a rational approach to God. Such a rationalistic approach to theology, attempts to know God through concepts derived through the method of abstraction. The fundamental mistake of this Thomistic approach is that it links knowledge of God to the created nous. If mind or nous is created, then its sphere of activity is linked to the created realm or the realm of being. Lossky sees these Western thinkers as isolating the locus for the union with God in the nous, and ultimately continuing the mistakes of such patristic thinkers as Clement, Origen and Evagrius. The end result, according to Lossky, is not an encounter with the personal, living God, but a limited, conceptual knowledge of God’s being.

The danger of such an approach finds its fullest expression for Lossky in the way Aquinas and the scholastic theologians conceive the Trinity, and in particular, their understanding of the filioque. For Rowan Williams, “it is, of course, Lossky’s attack on the filioque which is the most immediately striking feature of his polemic against Western theology”. It is also a position for which he will receive much criticism, by both Orthodox and non-Orthodox alike. Without doubt, Lossky considers the issue of the filioque as a serious obstacle to East-West unity. He does not, however, necessarily see the filioque as “the most crucial problem between the East and West”. The crucial problem for Lossky consists in the differences in theological method, and the filioque is the most evident example of how a faulty theological method can lead to a doctrine which threatens personhood, the independence of the Holy Spirit, and, ultimately, the possibilities for deification. As even Rowan Williams admits, “his [Lossky’s] unfairness and inaccuracy in particular criticisms of the West are not of primary significance; the essential complaint about Western intellectualism and subordination to philosophy remains unaffected, raising the whole question of rival conceptions of precisely how God is known, and how His activity is mediated in the world to created subjects”.

The controversy between East and West over the filioque is essentially a debate over the most adequate expression to explain the relations between the persons of the Trinity, particularly the person of the Holy Spirit. For Lossky, the most adequate expression is “relations of origin”, whereby the Father is the origin of the Son and the Spirit, while for the West it is “relations of opposition”, “according to which the Holy Spirit is said to proceed from the Father and the Son as from one principle of spiration”. The mistake of the West consists in attempting to understand the diversity within the Trinity from the perspective of the unified essence. He essentially agrees with Fr. Th. de Régnon, who writes that “Latin philosophy first considers the nature in itself and proceeds to the agent; Greek philosophy first con-
siders the agent and afterwards passes through it to find the nature.” It is the attempt to understand how the simple, unified essence can be diverse that leads the West to affirm that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both the Father and the Son.

Lossky lists three problems with this approach to understanding the diversity within the unified essence. For one, “the relations are the basis of the hypostases, which define themselves by their mutual opposition, the first to the second, and these two together to the third.” The “relations of opposition” here for Lossky introduce a type of dependence and necessity in God, especially in terms of the distinctiveness of the hypostases. Lossky further explains that “the relations only serve to express the hypostatic diversity of the Three; they are not the basis of it. It is the absolute diversity of the three hypostases which determines their differing relations to one another, not vice versa.” The diversity of the hypostases is then a “primordial fact” not dependent on relations based on mutual opposition.

The second problem for Lossky is the depersonalization of the Trinity. Insofar as the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son “the two persons represent a non-personal unity, in that they give rise to a further relation of opposition.” The third problem, and really a summation of the previous two, concerns the primacy of essence over the hypostases. The “relations of opposition” indicate that “in general the origin of the persons of the Trinity therefore is impersonal, having its real basis in the one essence, which is differentiated by its internal relations. The general character of this triadology may be described as a pre-eminence of natural unity over personal trinity, as an ontological primacy of the essence over the hypostases.” The solution does not consist in giving primacy to the hypostases over the divine ousia. In trinitarian theology the antinomy between the unity and diversity, expressed as that between person and nature must be maintained, and this only through the “relations of origin” which emphasize the monarchia of the Father. In the person of the Father the unity and diversity is presented simultaneously.

It is the antinomic character above all which distinguishes the Orthodox approach to the Trinity from that of the West. Lossky explains the difference in a lengthy quote worthy of citation:

The positive approach employed by Filioquist triadology brings about a certain rationalization of the dogma of the Trinity, insofar as it suppresses the fundamental antinomy between the essence and the hypostases. One has the impression that the heights of theology have been deserted in order to descend to the level of religious philosophy. On the other hand, the negative approach, which places us face to face with the primordial antinomy of absolute identity and no less absolute diversity in God, does not seek to conceal this antinomy but to express it fittingly, so that the mystery of the Trinity might make us transcend the philosophical mode of thinking and that the Truth might make us
free from our human limitations, by altering our means of understanding. If in the former approach faith seeks understanding, in order to transpose revelation onto the plane of philosophy, in the latter approach understanding seeks the realities of faith, in order to be transformed, by becoming more and more open to the mysteries of revelation.\(^{23}\)

Thus, “by the dogma of the Filioque, the God of the philosophers and savants is introduced into the heart of the Living God”.\(^{24}\) The fatal existential consequence of this introduction is that it precludes full personal communion with the divine. Insofar as doctrine, for Lossky, is central toward guiding one to the experience of God, which is a living of the doctrine, a theology based on a faulty theological method leads one down the wrong path. More importantly, a conception of God in terms of a substance ontology, which prioritizes the essence of God over the trinitarian diversity, cannot conceive of a real communion between God and humanity. It can only arrive at an idea of God in which there is no possibility for real communion.

Theology then, for Lossky, seeks not to eliminate what he would understand as contradictions within philosophical discourse. If theology ultimately attempts to express a God who is immanent and transcendent, and is the condition for the possibility for communion between two distinct ontological realities, then it must be in both form and content “antinomic”. According to Lossky,

the goal of this antinomic theology is not to forge a system of concepts, but to serve as a support for the human spirit in contemplation of divine mysteries. Every antinomic opposition of two true propositions gives way to a dogma, \textit{i.e.} to a real distinction, although ineffable and unintelligible, which cannot be based on any concepts or deduced by a process of reasoning, since it is the expression of a reality of a religious order.\(^{25}\)

Lossky’s handling of the challenges to the incoherency of the essence/energies distinction illustrates further the meaning of an “antinomic theology”. Lossky’s interpretation of Dionysius raises the obvious question that if the energies of God are eternal and contain the full presence of God, how is creation not necessary or itself divine? Lossky would argue that this type of question results from the philosophical drive for logical consistency, which is at odds with the antinomic character of the Incarnation. In order to preserve the soteriological principle resulting from the Incarnation, God must be affirmed as both a knowable and unknowable God. The Incarnation demands an “antinomic theology which proceeds by oppositions of contrary but equally true propositions”.\(^{26}\) Put another way, “the dialectic which governs the game of negations and affirmations” is defined as “an intellectual discipline of the non-opposition of opposites—a discipline which

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is proper for all discourse about true transcendence, the transcendence which remains ‘unimaginable’ for non-Christians (Ibid. 1, 5). The immanence and transcendence of God is an antinomic truth grasped by faith in a way reason cannot. The activities of God make God knowable, but only if such activities are fully God. Yet at the same time, such activities do not make creation divine since there are degrees of participation in the energies of God. The goal of salvation and the purpose of the Incarnation are to increase one’s participation in these energies in order to penetrate further the divine mystery. To safeguard this mystery of participation in God’s being, “one is forced to establish these distinctions . . . to safeguard the antinomy, to prevent the human spirit from being led astray, breaking the antinomy and falling then from the contemplation of divine mysteries into the platitude of rationalism, replacing living experience with concepts. The antinomy, on the contrary, raises the spirit from the realm of concepts to the concrete data of Revelation”, i.e., the Trinity. Thus, the logical inconsistency implied in the Orthodox understanding of the essence/energies distinction is not without purpose. It protects the reality of the mystical experience in theological expression, and prevents it from falling into a rationalistic complacency that would preclude an ecstatic union with God.

To summarize, for Lossky the essence/energies distinctions is rooted in the reality of the divine-human communion of the Incarnation. The hyper-essence of God expresses God’s transcendence, and, thus, freedom in relation to created reality and to any rationalistic conceptions of God. The immanence of God is expressed in the concept of energies; humans are saved through greater participation in God’s energies. The antinomic character of essence/energies or person/nature is purposeful, according to Lossky, in order to express the antinomic God who is immanent and transcendent and beyond reason. It also avoids complacency and serves to elevate toward personal, ecstatic union with God. But has the concept of energies always been the dominant soteriological category within the Eastern Christian tradition? We now turn to the theology of John Zizioulas for an alternative interpretation.

John Zizioulas: Ontology and Communion

Zizioulas’s first book, published in 1965, tries in part to establish the centrality of the eucharist in early Christian spirituality. The early Christians had a “eucharistic consciousness” which shaped the way they understood the God of Jesus Christ and, in turn, their own self-understanding. This eucharistic spirituality is manifested in the early Christian understanding of the eucharistic event as the fullness of the presence of God in history. This identification, Zizioulas argues, emerges from the early Christian sources in which truth is understood eschatologically and the eucharistic event is the event of the eschaton.
According to Zizioulas, the locus for the proleptic presence of the eschaton in history is the eucharist. Constitutive of the eucharistic consciousness of the early Christians was this identification of the eucharist with the eschaton. The eucharist is not the eschaton, but in the eucharistic event is manifested the presence of the eschaton in history. In the eucharist one “knows” truth, i.e., God, insofar as one is truth, i.e., acquires God’s mode of being. From the very beginning of Christian existence this eucharistic spirituality that identifies the eucharist with the eschaton is evident.

The eschatological identity of the eucharist in early Christian spirituality, moreover, has its basis in christology. The church as the body of Christ does not signify, according to Zizioulas, a merely moral identity. It is not the body of Christ by virtue of the gathering together in Christ’s name people who work together in unity as the various parts of a body. The church is the body of Christ for Zizioulas in an ontological sense. It is the real, eschatological body of the Risen Christ. It is this link with the Risen body of Christ, the eschatological Christ, which forms the basis for the identification of the eucharist with the eschaton, and which further allows Zizioulas to refer to the eucharist as an event of the body of Christ which is the eschaton.

This link between the risen body of Christ and the eucharist is possible, however, only through the Holy Spirit. What roots the “experience” of God in the eucharistic event is what Zizioulas calls a “pneumatologically conditioned christology”. Such a christology for Zizioulas entails an inherent unity between ecclesiology, christology and pneumatology.

Though present throughout his writing, two important articles set forth clearly Zizioulas’s pneumatology: “Implications ecclésiologiques de deux types de pneumatologie”, and “Christ the Spirit and the Church”. In the former, Zizioulas distinguishes between “two types” of pneumatologies in the early Church: the missionary-historical type and the eucharistic-eschatological type. Moreover, both types imply a certain christology and ecclesiology. In the missionary-historical type, the Holy Spirit is sent into history by the Son. Christology becomes “la source de la Pneumatologie” which thus becomes for Zizioulas a pneumatology “conditionnée par la Christologie”. In the framework of this type of christologically conditioned pneumatology, the church is defined in terms of mission. The chief aim of the church is to expand (exige) the dispersion.

The second type of pneumatology, often neglected by exegetes of the early Christian texts, is the eucharistic-eschatological type. Instead of following Christ or being sent by Christ, the Spirit realizes (conduire) the Resurrection of Christ. Contrary to the first type, in this type of Pneumatology “la Pneumatologie est la source de la Christologie”, thus leading to a “une Christologie conditionnée par la Pneumatologie”.

This pneumatologically conditioned christology has several implications for ecclesiology. First, insofar as the Spirit realizes the event of Christ in history, then the community formed by the communion of the Holy Spirit
iconically realizes the presence of Christ. Unlike the missionary-historical approach, there is no distance between the head and the body, but an identity so that Christ is always present in the world “avec son Église, sinon, tout simplement, comme son Église”. The activity of the Spirit guarantees that the identity of church is Christ. Put another way, “le je de l’Église, c’est le Christ”. This is not to deny the sinfulness of the church in history, but only to affirm the priority of its holiness as the presence of Christ in history.

Insofar as the Holy Spirit constitutes the eucharistic gathering as the body of Christ, the eschatological role of the Holy Spirit for Zizioulas must always be interpreted as an event of communion. The two fundamental aspects of Pneumatology, then, are “eschatology and communion”. If “only the Son becomes history”, according to Zizioulas, then the Spirit’s role is the exact opposite. The role of the Spirit is eschatological, which means it is the fulfillment of history. There is “no economy of the Spirit”, since the Spirit is not related to history in the same way as the Son. The Spirit brings the Kingdom into history, and in this sense does not become history but fulfills it. The Spirit does not simply lead us to the Kingdom, but makes it present. The church as the eucharistic synaxis is filled with the presence of the Spirit, which is the presence of the eschatological unity of all in Christ.

The “communion” aspect of pneumatology consists in constituting this “eschatological unity of all in Christ.” Zizioulas amplifies thus: “because of the involvement of the Holy Spirit in the economy, Christ is not just an individual, not ‘one’ but ‘many.’ This ‘corporate personality’ of Christ is impossible to conceive without Pneumatology.” In this way, “Pneumatology contributes to Christology this dimension of communion. And it is because of this function of Pneumatology that it is possible to speak of Christ as having a ‘body,’ i.e. to speak of ecclesiology, of the Church as the Body of Christ.” It is important to note here that the eschatological and communal aspects of the pneumatology are not separate moments, but, as with christology and pneumatology, simultaneous. In pneumatology, the eschatological is the communal and the communal, in the true sense of the unity of the “one” and the “many”, is the eschatological.

In summary, it is the eschatological-communion role of the Holy Spirit which justifies theologically Zizioulas’s identification of the eucharist with the eschaton. This identification constitutes the eucharist as the space of divine presence, and hence, as the source for theological knowledge. It is not that the Spirit was never active in creation before the birth of Christ, but with the “Christ event” the Spirit is active, on my reading of Zizioulas, in a new way. The activity of the Holy Spirit is now linked with the resurrection of Christ the fruits of which the Spirit makes present. There is also a particular understanding of the resurrection which informs this pneumatology, which in its simplest form is the unity of the divine and the human in Christ, and hence, the sanctification of the latter by the former. The resurrected Christ is the “corporate personality” who recapitulates all creation in himself. The
Spirit’s “new” activity renders the resurrected Christ present, and this not simply anywhere; but, specifically, in the eucharistic worshipping community, where the people are gathered in praise and offer the world to be sanctified. It is in this act of the people, this leitourgia, that the Spirit breaks through history and constitutes the Church as the body of Christ, i.e., as the eschatological presence of the triune life.

For Zizioulas, the early Christian eucharistic consciousness, the understanding of the eucharist as an event of communion in the body of Christ by the Holy Spirit, would prove decisive in the later patristic “ontological revolution”, i.e., the development of a communion ontology. The first steps toward such an ontology are seen in the writings of Ignatius of Antioch and Irenaeus of Lyon, who, according to Zizioulas, identify truth with life. What led Ignatius and Irenaeus to identify truth with life was not any intellectual movement, but their shared experience in the eucharistic community.

The patristic thinkers who would clarify this eucharistic understanding of the identity of truth with life, with special attention to the God-world relation and to God’s inner life, are Athanasius of Alexandria and the Cappadocian Fathers. Athanasius’s principle contribution to Christian theology, according to Zizioulas, consists in developing the “idea that communion belongs not to the level of will and action but to that of substance. Thus it establishes itself as an ontological category.” By ontological Zizioulas means here that communion is not added to the being of God, as something transitory, but is the being of God and as such is an eternal “being” or reality. Athanasius’s distinction also has profound cosmological implications. According to Zizioulas, Athanasius was largely responsible for the first “leavening” of Greek ontology, the second coming with the Cappadocians. This “leavening” consisted in upholding the biblical principle of God’s absolute freedom from the world, while adhering to the Greek concern with ontology.

The development of these ideas was aided by “the idea of communion which had acquired an ontological significance in and through the eucharistic approach to being”. Athanasius did, however, leave certain problems unanswered, such as the problem of freedom and communion, both within God’s life and between God and the world. Later Christian thinkers, particularly the Cappadocians, took up this problem.

The Cappadocians, argues Zizioulas, are responsible for no less than an “ontological revolution” in theological and philosophical thinking. The revolution is the notion of a relational ontology and identifying being with personhood, communion, otherness and particularity, rather than see the latter as additions to being. The real revolution of the Cappadocians, and particularly Basil of Caesarea, is the identification of prosopon with hypostasis. This identification is consistent with Basil’s preference for
koinonia over ousia as a category expressing the unity of God. Although Zizioulas does not state this explicitly, his interpretation suggests that the identification of prosopon with hypostasis is consistent with Basil’s hesitancy to use substantial categories with reference to God. If ousia or homousios were avoided by Basil for fear of Sabellianism or tritheism, then hypostasis, a substantial category, remains inadequate for expressing the distinctiveness of the three for the same reasons. The other problem with hypostasis by itself is that it does not express the relational dimension of God or the communion between the Three. Somehow a properly Christian theological category must express the distinctiveness while emphasizing both the relations between the Father, Son and Holy Spirit and their transcendence to the world.

**Prosopon** would have had this potential to express the relational dimension of a concrete being if it were an ontological category. According to Zizioulas, however, its use in Greco-roman thought was non-ontological. There was nothing “real” about the person in the theater or in society. The person was relational but lacked ontological status, and thus could be open to a Sabellian interpretation. Somehow the relational dimension of person needed to be combined with the ontological character of hypostasis and this is precisely, argues Zizioulas, the genius of Basil.\(^{53}\)

The ontological revolution that Zizioulas speaks of is precisely this identification of prosopon with hypostasis, together with all its implications. This identification was for Basil the most adequate way to express both the distinctiveness of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and yet their inseparable unity or koinonia. As persons the three are real ontological beings, i.e., hypostatic and are related to one another. The identification of prosopon with hypostasis protects the trinity from Sabellian or tritheistic interpretations. It affirms a God who is three and one, something that the experience of worship, the eucharist as the event of the body of Christ, demands. The identification of these two categories leads to an ontology of personhood, or a relational ontology, according to Zizioulas, which he argues is uniquely the product of the Greek fathers’ interpretation of their experience of the Body of Christ. Suffice it to say that with this identification it is possible, for the first time in late antique thought, to conceive of otherness, difference, communion and relation as ontological realities. The understandings of freedom, love, and the God-world relation also take on new meaning. What Zizioulas wants to stress here is that these insights are given to us for the first time by the Greek fathers in their attempt to give expression to their Trinitarian faith with its basis in the communal worship of the eucharist. As we shall see below, this attempt also provided answers to the most fundamental and timeless existential questions.

The Cappadocians affirm further this relational ontology through their insistence on the Father as the aitia of the trinitarian existence, or otherwise put, through their affirmation of the monarchia of the Father in trinitarian existence. An analysis of the principle of the monarchia of the Father will also
clarify the essential features of this trinitarian ontology of personhood. The Father as *aitia* of God’s trinitarian existence is the second “leavening” of Greek thought, or the second presupposition for an ontology of personhood. According to Zizioulas, this insistence is seen mostly in Gregory the Theologian and is consistent with Basil’s preference for *koinonia* and *prosopon* over *hypostasis* and *ousia* with respect to God. The Father as *aitia* supports a relational ontology in two ways: for one, it links the unity of God to the person of the Father rather than to the divine *ousia*. *Monarchia*, the one *arche*, in the Greek fathers was identified with the Father. According to Zizioulas, “the ‘one God’ is the Father, and not the one substance, as Augustinian and medieval Scholasticism would say”. This sense of *monarchia* means that God is one because of the Father, which evinces the priority for the Cappadocians of personal categories over substantial categories. Secondly, God’s trinitarian existence is the result of a person, the freedom and the love of the Father, not the necessity of substance. Zizioulas interprets the process of finding the logically highest name for God, such as Good or *Esse*, and trying to understand how the divine substance is trinitarian, as subjecting God’s existence to the determinism of substance. The Cappadocian preference for *aitia* (cause) over *pege* (source) indicates further their affirmation of the priority of a personal over a substantial ontology. “Whereas *pege* (source) could be understood substantially or naturalistically, *aitia* (cause) carried with it connotations of personal initiative . . . freedom. Divine being owes its being to a *free person*, not to impersonal substance.” To attribute the *aitia* of trinitarian existence to the person of the Father is to base such existence on freedom and love. Zizioulas is not speaking of freedom and love with relation to the world but within God’s own existence. As Zizioulas himself puts it bluntly, “God, as Father and not as substance, perpetually confirms through ‘being’ His *free* will to exist. And it is precisely His trinitarian existence that constitutes this confirmation: the Father out of love—that is, freely—begets the Son and brings forth the Spirit.” The Cappadocians thus introduced “freedom in ontology, something that Greek philosophy had never done before”. And they did this by making God’s own existence a result of the absolute, personal freedom of the Father.

According to Zizioulas, the affirmation of the monarchy of the Father is important for soteriological reasons. Although some interpret it as introducing a certain arbitrariness into God’s being, Zizioulas’s logic for affirming the monarchy of the Father is simple and makes clear the centrality for the notion of “person” for expressing divine-human communion. If the eucharistic experience reveals salvation to be a communion with the divine, one which bestows eternal life, then this salvation is personal in the sense that it is a freedom from the givenness inherent in created nature, which is the reality of death. Evident here are the profound existential concerns that underlie Zizioulas’s theology. Salvation is defined in terms of absolute freedom, which for Zizioulas is a freedom from the given.
created beings is created nature itself and the necessity of death. In communion with God, one transcends this giveness and is affirmed in his/her unique identity in an eternal relationship of love with the triune God. If, however, God’s own existence is not a result of freedom, then, Zizioulas argues, God cannot give what God does not have. Freedom becomes the precondition for love, the possibility for an uncoerced communion with the other. Though Zizioulas roots the ontology of personhood in God’s being, and though God’s trinitarian existence gives meaning to “person”, the “necessity” of absolute personal freedom in God’s existence for personal salvation from death reveals the extent to which existential concerns inform his theology.

The centrality of the concept of “person” for expressing divine-human communion is also evident in Zizioulas’s understanding of Chalcedonian christology. He interprets the Chalcedonian “two natures in one person” through the lens of a trinitarian understanding of personhood as hypostatic (unique) and ekstatic (freedom). For Zizioulas, “it emerges that in Christology the crucial thing for our subject is not the communicatio idiomatum but the hypostatic union”. The incarnation is not the event in which the divine energies are communicated in their fullness to the human nature; it is the event in which human nature itself exists, is, in the person of Christ. “What enables Man in Christ to arrive at a personal identity in ontological terms is that in Christ the natures are, only because they are particularized in one person.” What Christ offers for salvation for human existence, then, is not so much the divine energies as his own hypostasis.

For Man to acquire this ontology of personhood it is necessary to take an attitude of freedom vis-à-vis his own nature. If biological birth gives us a hypostasis dependent ontologically on nature, this indicates that a “new birth” is needed in order to experience an ontology of personhood. This “new birth”, which is the essence of Baptism, is nothing but the acquisition of an identity not dependent on the qualities of nature but freely raising nature to a hypostatic existence identical with that which emerges from the Father-Son relationship.

Thus, the significance of the union in Christ is not the communication of divine energies, but becoming a “son” of God by transforming one’s hypostasis through a relationship identical with that of the Son. Christ is the “one” and the “many” in whom our hypostases are not merged or absorbed, but transfigured, or rather constituted in the relationship which Christ has with the Father. It is within this relationship that the human person becomes, or exists eternally as a unique and unrepeatable being.

The significance of this move is, at least, twofold. For one, Zizioulas is claiming against those who may reject the use of “person” in trinitarian theology that the concept is the most adequate for expressing not simply the distinction between the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, but the divine-human...
communion through the person of the Son. The other point of significance is directed specifically to the Orthodox tradition, though, again, reverberations can be felt in the wider Christian discussion of divine-human communion. With his trinitarian ontology of personhood Zizioulas is, in effect, arguing against the use of “energies” as the central soteriological concept. This line of argumentation becomes especially clear when one considers Lossky’s own understanding of divine-human communion in Christ. For Lossky salvation of the human person involves a personal reception of the energies of God. Within the ecclesial context, one receives a deified human nature by being baptized into Christ. In being united to the body of Christ, the Church, one participates in the work of Christ in receiving a deified human nature. Reception of this deified human nature, however, is only one part of the equation in a process of salvation which must involve both nature and person. Upon being united to the body of Christ, one is then able, has the capacity, to grow toward perfection. This perfection is a process of growth toward personhood in the energies of God. Personhood is the goal; the means are the energies of God conveyed through the person of the Holy Spirit. One assimilates more fully in personal existence made possible by the oikonomia, the energies of God already present throughout creation. Personal existence is, for Lossky, in the end one which mirrors that of Christ: as Christ is one person who possesses a divine and human nature, the deified person is one who possesses a deified human nature and the divine energies. This process of salvation also makes clear Lossky’s understanding of the importance of Chalcedonian christology. For Lossky, human nature is united to the divine in the one person of Christ in order to be deified. This human nature is then offered to humanity within the Church.

What is centrally at issue is how to conceptualize divine-human communion. Both Lossky and Zizioulas would reject the use of divine essence for such conceptualizations, since it results in pantheism. Lossky, however, would also reject the use of hypostasis, which indicates exclusively distinction within God’s being. Moreover, the hypostatic union itself, the union of the divine and human natures is “proper to the Son alone, in whom God becomes man without ceasing to be the second Person of the Trinity”. He continues, “Even though we share the same human nature as Christ and receive in Him the name of Sons of God, we do not ourselves become the divine hypostasis of the Son by the fact of the Incarnation. We are unable, therefore, to participate in either the essence or the hypostasis of the Holy Trinity.” The reality of divine-human communion, therefore, requires, according to Lossky, another distinction within God’s being. “This distinction is that between the essence of God, or His nature, properly so-called, which is inaccessible, unknowable and incomunicable; and the energies or divine operations, forces proper to and inseparable from God’s essence, in which He goes forth from Himself, manifests, communicates, and gives Himself.” Zizioulas thus seems to depart from what some would argue is
identifiably “Eastern Orthodox”, the centrality of the concept of “energies” for expressing a realistic notion of divine-human communion. In the next section, I will discuss the reasons for his differences with Lossky and attempt to evaluate the adequacies of their theologies by judging their coherency.

Ontology vs. Apophaticism

The central reason that would explain Zizioulas’s differences with Lossky is his attitude toward apophaticism. As we have seen, for Lossky apophaticism is rooted in the Incarnation itself and is the only adequate means to express the transcension and immanence of God. Apophaticism is the only way to affirm a trinitarian God, and he would question Zizioulas as to how, in fact, it is possible that one can speak of a trinitarian ontology of personhood. Zizioulas’s own understanding of a trinitarian ontology implies a less central role for apophaticism in conceiving a God who is immanent and transcendent. One could frame this debate around Karl Rahner’s famous axiom, “the ‘economic’ Trinity is the ‘immanent’ Trinity and vice versa”. Lossky would reject such an identification, adhering to a strict separation between oikonomia and theologia as required by an apophatic approach to God. Zizioulas would accept a qualified understanding of this axiom, but on what grounds?

It must first be remembered that Zizioulas himself is not negating the importance of apophaticism for theology, but affirming the priority of ontology over apophaticism. Zizioulas’s contribution lies in providing the means to link apophaticism and ontology within trinitarian reflection. In this sense, his thought is not so much a rejection of Lossky’s as it is a completion. It is true that Zizioulas himself gives the impression that his thought represents a radical break from that of Lossky’s. Zizioulas critiques various aspects of Lossky’s theology, such as his understanding of the filioque and his pneumatology. The impression, however, of a radical break is most evident in Zizioulas’s trenchant critique of Lossky’s apophaticism and its implications for trinitarian theology. In addressing this critique, it will be shown that Zizioulas’s affirmation of the primacy of ontology over apophaticism in Orthodox theology represents not so much a break but a completion of Lossky’s thought, inasmuch as Lossky’s later writings indicate a move toward affirming the ontological character of person. Although Zizioulas presents a more adequate theological position, his critique of Lossky is often unfair.

In responding to certain criticisms made by the Greek Orthodox theologians John Panagopoulos and Savas Agourides, Zizioulas decries what he calls the “allergy to ontology”. He feels this antipathy to ontology in contemporary Orthodox theology is due largely to the influence of Vladimir Lossky, whom he calls “a typical representative of the Slavophile tradition of a mysticism of Sobornost”. Lossky, according to Zizioulas, advanced an understanding of apophaticism “unknown in the Greek patristic tradition”.

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His understanding of apophaticism is closer to neo-platonism than the Greek patristic theology which Zizioulas interprets as being rooted in the eucharistic communion with the trinitarian God. The biggest danger Zizioulas sees to a Losskian apophaticism is that it ineluctably leads to a “mystical trinitarianism” in which the particularities of the persons of the Trinity are eviscerated. As evidence of this, Zizioulas quotes a passage from Lossky’s *The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church*:

> The goal to which apophatic theology leads...it is a question of an ascent towards the infinite; this infinite goal is not a nature or an essence, *nor is it a person*; it is something which *transcends* all notion of nature and *person*: it is Trinity.

Zizioulas cites this passage as evidence that the priority given to apophaticism by Lossky weakens, if not obliterates, a doctrine of the Trinity. It is to this understanding of apophaticism which Zizioulas refers as he attempts to argue for the priority of ontology within Orthodox theology.

Before analyzing Zizioulas’s case for ontology within Orthodox theology, a few words must be said of Zizioulas’s reading of Lossky, which, from the outset, one could judge is incomplete. Although, as I have indicated, apophaticism is central to Lossky’s theology, Zizioulas ignores or is simply unaware of Lossky’s position that “La théologie négative ne va jamais jusqu’à la négation des personnes.” In fact, Lossky later clarifies that apophaticism for the Cappadocians was a tool to de-conceptualize trinitarian concepts of their philosophical meaning in order to ascribe them to the “mystery of a personal God in His transcendent nature.” Clearly, Lossky’s emphasis on apophaticism was not intended to eliminate the irreducibility of the personal distinctiveness within the Trinity. Ironically, Lossky felt that apophaticism was the only way to preserve this personal distinctiveness, since it constituted the only viable alternative to a Thomistic rationalism and Russian Sophiology which, according to Lossky, reduces *de facto* the irreducibility in God.

Why, then, this gross misreading of Lossky on the part of Zizioulas? It is not so much, as some have argued, that Zizioulas is simply responding to his critics’ misappropriation of Lossky’s apophaticism that is radicalized in ways not present in Lossky. Zizioulas is clearly familiar with Lossky’s work to the point where he is able to make his own assessments. Moreover, though he mentions Lossky’s influence on his critics, Zizioulas is responding to particular passages within the Losskian corpus. The fact that he bases a good deal of his criticism of Lossky’s apophaticism on a reading of *The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church* reveals much about Zizioulas’s reaction. It is in this, the earliest work of Lossky, where Lossky’s theology of person is least developed. In his later work Lossky was much more willing to argue for, what I would term, an ontological content to the category of person as *hypostatic* and *ekstatic*, one strikingly similar to Zizioulas’s understanding of...
person, based on its application in trinitarian theology, without abandoning the apophatic foundation to trinitarian theology.\textsuperscript{85} Although we may assume that Zizioulas is familiar with Lossky’s later work, he clearly does not account for this development in his thought. Given this progression in Lossky’s thought, one cannot argue, as Zizioulas did, that Lossky engaged in a “mystical trinitarianism”. A more proper assessment is that there exists an unresolved tension in Lossky between apophaticism, which he sees as the only alternative to a reductive rationalism, and his theology of person that is implicitly an ontology of person. In this sense, Zizioulas could then argue, as he does, that the priority given to apophaticism in Orthodox theology threatens to undercut an ontology necessary for an adequate expression of God as Trinity. Instead of a radical break, Zizioulas will succeed in putting the other half of Lossky’s theology, that of person, on a firmer foundation. In order to do this, he must reduce the importance of apophaticism. He limits apophaticism not, as Lossky feared, by reverting to rationalism. Zizioulas transcends the Losskian dialectic between apophaticism and rationalism by rooting theology in the liturgical experience of God.

The key argument against Lossky’s apophaticism lies in Zizioulas’s affirmation that the communion of the created with the uncreated in Christ and made present in the eucharist is an experience of the immanent trinity, i.e., God’s being in itself. To give expression to this affirmation, the crucial distinction is not that between essence and energies, but between the existence of God and the \textit{way} in which God exists. Not surprisingly, Zizioulas attributes this distinction to the Cappadocians.

In their attempt to give expression to God as Trinity, the Greek fathers, especially the Cappadocians, made a threefold distinction in speaking of the existence of God. First they affirmed that God existed (\textit{hoti esti}), which for the Greek fathers is discernible not simply in the experience of God in Christ, but in creation itself. The other two distinctions deal specifically with God’s trinitarian existence. In Greek patristic theology, essence or \textit{ousia} indicated what was common to the three persons of the Trinity. According to Zizioulas, the \textit{ousia} of God referred to the \textit{what} (\textit{ti esti}) of God’s existence.\textsuperscript{86} The personal distinctions in God were expressed, as I have shown, through the category of person. Zizioulas avers that the trinitarian existence of God as persons referred, for the Greek fathers, to the \textit{how} (\textit{hopos esti}) or the \textit{tropos hyparxeos} (the mode of being) of God’s being.\textsuperscript{87} Zizioulas argues that for the Cappadocians the \textit{what} of God’s existence, i.e., God’s \textit{ousia}, is completely transcendent and unknowable, and it is there that “theology has nothing to say”.\textsuperscript{88} Apophaticism has its place in relation to the essence of God, since it is God’s \textit{ousia} which is unknowable. Its sphere of influence, however, does not extend over God’s trinitarian existence. If theology has nothing to say about the \textit{what} of God’s existence, it must necessarily speak about the \textit{how} of God’s existence, the personal existence of God, since this personal existence is revealed and, hence, known experientially.\textsuperscript{89} It is God’s personal
existence, i.e., as Trinity, that God “draws near to us, is known...only as person.” Zizioulas adds that within an Orthodox liturgical context, one prays neither to the ousia of God nor to the energies of God, but to the persons. The hopos esti or tropos hyparxeos of God’s existence is knowable, because it is experienced. The implication for Zizioulas is that this knowledge makes possible a theological ontology in which the personal distinctions in God have an absolute character. The trinitarian categories do not serve simply to indicate that God is Trinity, but express an ontology rooted in God’s very being and in which otherness and particularity have ontological priority.

It is the identification of the hopos esti or the how of God existence with God’s trinitarian existence that allows Zizioulas to argue for the priority of a trinitarian ontology over apophaticism within Orthodox theology. He does not argue for this priority simply by an appeal to the hoti esti or the fact that God exists. Although it is not wrong to say that an ontology of God is possible by virtue of affirming God’s existence, Zizioulas is not arguing for the priority of such an ontology. He would argue that such an ontology can be established without appeals to God’s revelation in Christ. It would be not only distinct from, but also mutually exclusive of a trinitarian ontology of personhood, in that the former would assert the primacy of essence over the trinitarian persons, since the latter are only known in the revelation of Christ. Moreover, without the necessary identification of the hopos esti with God’s trinitarian existence, and without the subsequent argument that this hopos esti of God is experienced, and hence known, God’s revelation in Christ would simply affirm that God is Trinity. It could not form the basis for a trinitarian ontology of personhood which presupposes a knowledge of how God exists as Trinity, and thus, according to Zizioulas’s logic, an experience of this how of trinitarian existence. In order to justify the necessity of a trinitarian ontology of personhood, Zizioulas refers not to the hoti esti, but the hopos esti, the how of God’s existence which is experienced in the Body of Christ.

Lossky nowhere makes the threefold distinction that exists in Zizioulas’s thought, though he does make reference to the tropos hyparxeos which Zizioulas identifies with the how of God’s existence. He is not, however, consistent in his use of the category, sometimes using it to refer to God’s energies, other times to God’s triune existence. This inconsistency reveals that it does not have the same import for his theology as it does for Zizioulas. It also indicates that Zizioulas is interpreting the patristic category in a way not seen by Lossky, thus providing further evidence of its importance for understanding the differences between them.

The crucial difference between Lossky and Zizioulas is that the latter is making a claim that God in theologia is knowable, though not exhaustively so, and it is this knowledge which forms the condition for the possibility of expressing theologically a trinitarian ontology of personhood.
epistemological differences become even more manifest in Zizioulas’s treatment of apophaticism and the essence/energies distinction. Apophaticism is no longer foundational in God-talk, while person replaces energies as the dominant soteriological concept. The concept of divine energies is not as central to Zizioulas’s soteriology as it is to Lossky’s. There are two important qualifiers which Zizioulas places on this patristic concept that are not as clearly stated in Lossky. For one, Zizioulas emphatically affirms that an energy is never apersonal. The energies of God are communicated only through the persons of the Trinity. This emphasis on the personal character of energies is indicative of the primacy of an ontology of personhood and communion in Zizioulas’s thought. Second, salvation is not described for Zizioulas as an increase in participation in the divine energies, but as the transformation of being into true personhood in the person of Christ. The important point here is that the ontology of personhood and communion which emerges from Zizioulas’s understanding of the eucharist as a communion event in the Body of Christ forms the basis for Zizioulas’s understanding of the God-world relation, and more importantly, the eastern patristic notion of energies. Such an ontology leads Zizioulas to affirm a much more humble role for “energies” in his theology than that of Lossky.

Given this substantial difference between Lossky and Zizioulas, whose thought is judged more adequate and on what grounds? Notwithstanding the fact that all theologies are subject to criticism, Lossky’s and Zizioulas’s theologies can be comparatively judged on the basis of their shared central commitment, divine-human communion. On this criterion, Lossky’s own theology suffers from internal incoherencies. More substantially, apophaticism itself cannot express the divine-human communion as Lossky himself argues, and in effect, collapses into an ontology of substance, which Lossky has consistently attributed to “Western rationalism”.

There is a tension, as I have attempted to demonstrate, in Lossky’s theology between his emphasis on apophaticism and his theological notion of person, whose general features are strikingly similar to Zizioulas’s theological notion of person. There are passages where Lossky affirms that the categories of person and nature used to express the unity and plurality of the triune life express nothing about the trinitarian being. They are simply used to express that God is trinity. There is an apophaticism which shrouds the trinitarian categories.

Lossky, however, appears to break through the bright darkness of apophaticism when he begins to speak of person as ekstasis, freedom and love. He gives content to the category of person in such a way that person no longer indicates simply the trinitarian distinctions, but how the Father, Son and Holy Spirit exist as persons. This content is even clearer in his reflections on the rationale for the monarchy of the Father. He is, in effect, expressing something about the trinitarian being of God, i.e., about how God is as Trinity.
The problem for Lossky is that he does not have the conceptual apparatus to link his theological notion of person with his apophaticism, primarily because of the priority given to apophaticism in theological method. It seems that such a claim of trinitarian personhood must somehow be grounded epistemologically, and according to Lossky, God’s immanent being is unknowable. We are able to speak of God through God’s oikonomia, but what God communicates in this oikonomia is primarily God’s energies and not trinitarian personhood, though the persons are the medium for communicating these energies. Moreover, the energies are the communication of God’s attributes that, in terms of naming God, belong to the hyper-essence of God. Theology could say that God is good, divine, etc., but these names always are pale reflections of God’s true essence. In terms of the Trinity, theology, according to apophatic logic, can only say that God is Trinity, not how. The point here is that Lossky gives some reflection on this how of Trinitarian existence, and takes a further step in attempting to draw an analogy, an identity-in-difference, between this divine personhood and human personhood. But there is no way of grounding this analogy if in fact apophaticism precludes any knowledge of divine personhood. Though he tends toward a trinitarian ontology of personhood in which to be a trinitarian person is to exist as freedom and love, Lossky’s apophatic distinction between theologia and oikonomia leaves such a trinitarian understanding of personhood ungrounded. How can one know that God exists as trinitarian persons as freedom and love if God in Godself is shrouded in the apophaticism of the hyper-essence? Thus, Lossky’s own affirmation of the centrality of the theological notion of person is undermined by the primacy of apophaticism in his doctrine of God. If he is to maintain the theological concept of person as irreducibility, freedom and ecstatic love, then apophaticism must have a more restricted role in his theological scheme, and the gap between theologia and oikonomia must be bridged. A theology of person based on the doctrine of the Trinity must somehow give an account of how God’s trinitarian existence as a communion of persons is known, i.e., it requires a knowledge of theologia based on God’s oikonomia. To affirm, however, any degree of knowledge of God in theologia is to move away from apophaticism as the epistemological foundation for theology. For this reason, one could raise the question of whether Lossky’s apophaticism results in an adequate trinitarian theology—though one cannot go so far as Zizioulas to say that Lossky’s apophaticism obliterates the trinitarian distinctions, since apophaticism does not necessarily exclude a doctrine of God as Trinity.

There is also the question of whether Lossky’s apophaticism tends to prioritize the hyper-essence of God over the trinitarian persons and whether it is this distinction between non-being/being which informs the other aspects of theology rather than trinitarian theology. Such a prioritization might be discerned in Lossky’s soteriology, where the primary soteriological concept is the energies of God rather than trinitarian personhood. In this sense, does
salvation refer primarily to the *hyper-*essence of God, no matter how Lossky attempts to link the energies with the trinitarian persons? There is a confusion in Lossky’s doctrine of God which results from attempting to affirm simultaneously a transcendent and immanent God based on the essence/energies distinction, and a Triune God whose diversity is rooted in the *monarchia* of the Father. To affirm, as Lossky does, that one cannot speak of God on the realm of *theologia*, that God in Godself is shrouded in apophaticism, is, ironically, to continue to make primary “essence” language in God-talk. Lossky’s criticism of the West is that to understand the trinitarian God based on a metaphysics of substance is to efface the diversity in the Trinity. But Lossky himself continues to make essence, albeit hyper-essence, primary in God-talk by affirming that one cannot speak of God as Trinity other than to express it as a “primordial fact”.

Lossky’s attempt to analogize personal growth in the divine energies to Christology also manifests this primacy. He explains that as the two natures are united in the person of Christ, so in the human person progressing toward deification, the human (nature) and the divine (energies) are united. The analogy breaks down, however, in the sense that what is divine in Christ, i.e., the nature, is distinct from what is divine in the human person. Furthermore, there is no personal growth in the person of Christ. Moreover, one wonders how this analogy coheres with the analogy of deified personhood to divine personhood as freedom from nature. Finally, a related question remains concerning salvation, inasmuch as Lossky conceives of salvation in terms of participation in the triune personal existence of God. Though the divine persons communicate the divine energies, the issue is whether participation in the divine energies is something less than participation in the triune personal existence of God, especially since divine personhood is itself something more than a participation in the divine energies.

The adequacy of Zizioulas’s thought, however, goes beyond simply giving an interpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity as a doctrine of salvation, i.e., that deification is trinitarian through unity in the *hypostasis* of Christ, in a way not possible within Lossky’s thought. It consists also in the types of distinctions needed in order to conceptualize divine-human communion, particularly that in Christ. Both Lossky and Zizioulas agree that the language of “essence” fails to conceptualize adequately divine-human communion. It either leads to pantheism or, in the end and somewhat ironically, to a God incapable of real communion. For Lossky, the answer lies in identifying God’s energies as divine. As I have argued, however, this does not allow him to escape the language of essence in the way he thinks it does, and hence, he may be unwittingly undercutting his own attempts at affirming the realism of divine-human communion.

For Zizioulas, the realism of divine-human communion requires a further distinction other than that between God’s essence and God’s action/energies/*dunameis*. This distinction is given with the Cappadocian reworking of
hypostasis. The many detractors of Zizioulas’s interpretation of the Greek fathers notwithstanding,⁹⁸ what is suggestive about Zizioulas’s theology is his claim that hypostasis both in its trinitarian and christological developments must imply more than simply identifying the fact of irreducible distinctions in God, or the means for uniting divine and human natures. Hypostasis is that in and through which divine-human communion is realized, and is a distinction necessary not simply for conceptualizing how such a communion is possible in Christ, but how it is possible at all. In this sense, Zizioulas’s “ontology”, though not explicit in the Greek fathers, may be interpreted to be consistent with their own logic. For Athanasius, the affirmation against Arius that Christ is divine has as its basis the following claim: for God to be transcendent and immanent in a way that both saves creation from “nothing” and protects human freedom, there needs to be a mediator that is fully divine and fully human.⁹⁹ If this is the case, then hypostasis becomes not simply a way of indicating what is distinct in God or a philosophical way of showing how it is reasonable to claim that God is one and three without threatening God’s simplicity. The reworking of hypostasis itself has as its basis the realism of divine-human communion in Christ, who is fully God and fully human. In this sense, Zizioulas is correct in thinking that hypostasis is the category through which to think divine-human communion, especially if such a communion is to be trinitarian, i.e., in Christ. The language of hypostasis allows for a conceptualization of the realism of such a divine-human communion in a way not open to language of essence or of hyper-essence.

Zizioulas’s theological synthesis is thus more coherent than Lossky’s in that he provides a theological argument for how one knows the trinitarian God, which is necessary if one is to affirm, in fact, a trinitarian God and that salvation itself is trinitarian. He is able to ground epistemologically his trinitarian ontology in the eucharistic experience of the personal existence of the Triune God. Zizioulas also is able to account for why Christians affirm a trinitarian God, i.e., to explain the link between a trinitarian God and deification. More substantially, however, Zizioulas provides the kinds of distinction not present in Lossky in order to conceptualize the realism of divine-human communion. Though Lossky develops a trinitarian ontology of person similar to that of Zizioulas, the apophatic thrust to his theology cannot sufficiently ground such an ontology. It also shapes his understanding of other theological dogmas in ways that do not easily cohere with his trinitarian theology of person, thereby affirming that which Lossky feared most, an ontology of substance.

NOTES

2 Ibid., p. 64.
4 Ibid., p. 31.
8 For Lossky’s interpretation of these patristic figures, see *The Vision of God*, trans. Asheleigh Moorhouse (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1983).
9 The Theology of Vladimir Nikolaievich Lossky, p. 129.
10 For a thorough critique of Lossky’s own criticisms of the West, especially in relation to the *filioque*, see ibid., pp. 129–156. On the Orthodox side, John Zizioulas comments that “Lossky’s views have led to extremes that are beginning to show the weaknesses of his position. The way he brought out the *Filioque* issue as the crucial problem between the East and West is a clear example of how much Lossky’s trinitarian theology stands in need of revision” (“The Doctrine of God the Trinity Today: Suggestions for an Ecumenical Study” in *The Forgotten Trinity* [London: BCC/CCBI, 1991], p. 110). Zizioulas, however, fails to elaborate and clarify what he means by Lossky’s “extremes” and “weaknesses”. Below it will be shown what Zizioulas feels is “in need of revision” in Lossky’s trinitarian theology, but without indicating how this revision might affect a Losskian stance toward the *filioque*.
11 As Zizioulas argues. The fact that he himself was open to an alternative understanding of the *filioque* is an indication that the *filioque* in itself was not the most crucial problem for Lossky. Olivier Clément argues that Lossky advanced such an alternative in course lectures given on 11 July 1955. See Clément, *Orient-Occident: Deux Passeurs: Vladimir Lossky et Paul Évédikimov* (Genève: Éditions Labor et Fides, 1985), p. 61, note 175.
13 The Procession of the Holy Spirit in Orthodox Trinitarian Doctrine”, p. 156.
14 The Procession of the Holy Spirit in Orthodox Trinitarian Doctrine”, p. 76.
15 As quoted in *The Mystical Theology*, pp. 57–58. Also cited in “The Procession of the Holy Spirit in Orthodox Trinitarian Doctrine”, p. 78, note 10; the de Régnon citation comes from *Études de théologie positive sur la Sainte Trinité* I (Paris, 1892), p. 309. Michel René Barnes’s claim that de Régnon influenced Lossky’s trinitarian theology, although it cannot be disputed, needs careful qualification (see his, “De Régnon Reconsidered”, *Augustinian Studies* Vol. 26 no. 2 [1995], pp. 51–79). Barnes argues that de Régnon’s paradigm that Latin trinitarian theology begins with the unity of nature and that Greek trinitarian theology begins with the diversity of persons had considerable influence on trinitarian theology in the twentieth century, Lossky included. He cites chapter three of *The Mystical Theology* as evidence. Yet in the same chapter Lossky says, “Nevertheless, the two ways were both equally legitimate so long as the first did not attribute to the essence a supremacy over the three persons, nor the second to the three persons a supremacy over the common nature” (p. 56). It is clear that Lossky uses de Régnon in support of the claim that Latin trinitarian theology, particularly Aquinas, depersonalized the trinity by starting with the unity of essence. The other tendency of emphasizing the persons over the nature is the mistake of Russian sophiology, represented in the person of Bulgakov. What is important to Lossky is the antinomy between nature and person in the Trinity. This is secured by the monarchy of the Father, and the significance of the Cappadocian contribution to trinitarian thought was not where they started, but the way they secured the trinitarian antinomy by affirming the monarchy
of the Father. More will be said below on Lossky’s understanding of the antinomic character of theology. Barnes also mentions how ten citations of de Régnon that were present in chapter three of the original French edition of The Mystical Theology were eliminated in the 1957 English translation. It seems, however, a bit presumptuous on Barnes’s part to conclude that “there is in fact the appropriation of de Régnon’s paradigm by modern Neo-Palamite theology, coupled with a hesitation, if not embaressment (sic), at acknowledging its Roman Catholic (indeed, Jesuit) origins”. Lossky’s own ecumenical interests throughout his life would appear to contradict such an accusation. Furthermore, of the two quotations left in the translation, the one cited in this footnote and that on page 64 acknowledge the use of the paradigm. Throughout the third chapter of The Mystical Theology, both in the English and French editions, it is evident that Lossky is not “embarrassed” to acknowledge his indebtedness to de Régnon, citing him in support of certain claims, and qualifying his paradigm with respect to the relation between person and nature within trinitarian theology. The other citations eliminated from the English edition simply indicated the location in de Régnon’s book of the Greek patristic texts Lossky cites. Perhaps this information was simply thought redundant or unnecessary for an English speaking audience, since what is important to Lossky’s argument is the patristic text itself.

18 Ibid., p. 79.
19 Ibid., p. 77. For a critique, see Williams, The Theology of Vladimir Nikolaievich Lossky, p. 154. Williams’s position is also affirmed by Wayne J. Hankey in “Theoria versus Poesis: Neoplatonism and Trinitarian Difference in Aquinas, John Milbank, Jean-Luc Marion and John Zizioulas”, Modern Theology Vol. 15 no. 4 (October, 1999), pp. 387–415.
21 This is Bulgakov’s mistake; see ibid., p. 93.
22 Ibid., p. 81.
23 Ibid., p. 80.
24 Ibid., p. 88.
26 Ibid., p. 51.
27 “Apophasis and Trinitarian Theology”, p. 26; the ibid. refers to Dionysius’s Mystical Theology. This principle of the “non-opposition of opposites” is significant for Lossky’s understanding of the relation of apophasis to Trinitarian theology.
29 “The Theology of Light”, p. 52.
33 The latter is Chapter 3 of Being as Communion.
35 Ibid., p. 141.
36 Ibid., p. 142.
37 Ibid., pp. 142–143.
38 Ibid., p. 144.
40 Ibid.
A confusion exists in the way Zizioulas employs the term "economy". On the one hand, he insists on rejecting an "economy of the Spirit" suggested by Lossky, arguing that only the Son "becomes history", thus implicitly arguing for an "economy" of the Son ("The economy, therefore, in so far as it assumed history and has a history, is only one and that is the Christ event" [Being as Communion, p. 130]); on the other hand, he argues that "the contributions of each of these divine persons to the economy bears its own distinctive characteristics which are directly relevant for ecclesiology in which they have to be reflected" (Being as Communion, p. 130). But as Zizioulas himself states, "To be involved in history is not the same as to become history" (Being as Communion, p. 130). "Economy of the Spirit" makes Zizioulas nervous, since it implies an involvement in history which diminishes the eschatological role of the Spirit. Thus, there is God's economy in relation to history, and the economy of the Son who alone becomes history. If the Spirit's role is eschatological, the Spirit's relation in history is to make the eschaton present and to fulfill history.

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Zizioulas affirms that “since the Person in its identification with hypostasis is an ultimate ... ontological notion, it must be a Person ... that is the source of divine existence” (“The Teaching of the 2nd Ecumenical Council on the Holy Spirit in Historical and Ecumenical Perspective,” p. 37).


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60 Ibid.

61 “Being as Communion”, p. 41.


64 “Being as Communion”, p. 43.

65 “On Being a Person: Towards an Ontology of Personhood”, p. 43.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid. For a similar argument, see Being as Communion, pp. 50–65. See also, “Human Capacity and Human Incapacity”, Scottish Journal of Theology Vol. 28 (1975), p. 437.


71 “Without an apophatic theology, which would allow us to go beyond the economic Trinity, and to draw a sharp distinction between ontology and epistemology ... or between being and revelation, God and the world become an unbreakable unity and God’s transcendence is at stake” (“The Doctrine of God as Trinity”, pp. 23–24). For Zizioulas, apophaticism serves two fundamental purposes. One, it qualifies Rahner’s axiom so that it is not misunderstood to mean that the world is necessary for God to be Trinity or that God is Trinity only in relation to the world. Zizioulas adds, “With the help of apophatic theology we may say that, although the Economic Trinity is the Immanent Trinity, the Immanent Trinity is not exhausted in the Economic Trinity” (p. 24). The fact that Zizioulas would accept some identification between what Lossky describes as theologia (Immanent Trinity) and oikonomia is a significant difference, especially in relation to their understanding of apophaticism.


76 Ibid. This critique is, to say the least, odd and surprising, especially given Lossky’s rejection of Russian religious philosophy. It is one thing to say that he may have been influenced by this tradition in attempting to resolve similar problems through the Greek patristic tradition—such as uniting collectivity and individuality and the notion of personal freedom—but Lossky’s own solutions to these issues clearly place him out of the “Slavophile tradition”. Moreover, Zizioulas is not clear on how Lossky’s apophaticism is linked to the Slavophile tradition of Sobornost.

77 Ibid., p. 21.

78 Ibid., pp. 21–22.

79 As quoted in Zizioulas, “The Being of God and the Being of Man”, p. 21; the emphases are Zizioulas’s; the translation is from The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, p. 44.

80 There is a tension in Lossky’s thought between apophaticism and a theology of personhood. This tension is evident when, on the one hand, Lossky affirms that “The goal to which apophatic theology leads—if, indeed, we may speak of goal or ending when, as here, it is a question of an ascent towards the infinite; this infinite goal is not a nature or an essence,
nor is it a person; it is something which transcends all notion both of nature and of person: it is the Trinity” (The Mystical Theology, p. 44); and, on the other hand, “La théologie négative ne va jamais jusqu’à la négation des personnes” (As quoted in Rowan Williams, “The Via Negativa and The Foundations of Theology: An Introduction to the Thought of V. N. Lossky” in New Studies in Theology, eds. Stephen Sykes and Derek Holmes [London: Duckworth, 1980], p. 102. As Williams notes, the citation “comes from transcripts of tape recordings from lecture courses” [p. 96]. The date of this particular lecture is 24 November 1955. The fact that it occurs later than The Mystical Theology is not insignificant, since as I intimated above, Lossky was moving more toward an ontological understanding of person in terms of freedom, love and communion).

82 One might also add God’s freedom from necessity. It is somewhat surprising, if not astonishing, that Zizioulas groups Lossky with Pavel Florensky and other sophiologists who reduce the Trinity to “logical necessity” (“The Being of God and the Being of Man”, p. 32). Apophasism and the category of person for Lossky were essential to theology because they liberated God from the necessity of being. To group Lossky with the Sophiologists only indicates an imprecise reading of Lossky on the part of Zizioulas, especially of Lossky’s later works.

83 Michel Stavrou, L’Approche Théologique de La Personne chez Vladimir Lossky et Jean Zizioulas: à L’Image et à La Ressemblance de Dieu, (PhD. dissertation, Paris: Institut de Théologie Orthodoxe Saint-Serge, April 1996), p. 170. See also Constantin Agoras, “L’anthropologie théologique de Jean Zizioulas: Un bref aperçu”, Contacts Vol. 41 [1989], p. 19. Stavrou and Agoras argue that Zizioulas reads Lossky through John Panagopoulos’s interpretation, who radicalizes Lossky’s apophaticism. If one reads Panagopoulos, however, there are few references to Lossky, and the two citations to Lossky do not refer to his apophaticism. Apophasism is a central theme in Orthodox thought and one cannot de facto attribute Panagopoulos’s use of it to Lossky’s influence.
84 See especially Orthodox Theology, pp. 27–49, where Lossky speaks of how “the Fathers, by specializing their meaning, came to be able, without external hindrance, to root personhood in being, and to personalize ontology” (p. 41). This text contains translations of articles which Lossky wrote later in his life, and which were first published posthumously in Messager Vol. 46–48 (1964); Vol. 49–50 (1965).
85 In a personal conversation with Christos Yannaras, who has also developed a theology of personhood similar to that of Lossky’s and Zizioulas’s, he admitted to me that one of the starting points for his thought was Lossky’s theology of person. In a personal conversation with Zizioulas, he indicated to me that one of the influences for his ontology of personhood was Yannaras. In then suggesting to Zizioulas that perhaps Lossky influenced him indirectly, Zizioulas was willing to admit that that may be the case, but added that the influence would be slight, given the substantial differences between their theologies.
86 “The Being of God and the Being of Man”, p. 23.
87 Ibid. For the distinction between the what and the how of God’s existence, see also “The Doctrine of the Holy Trinity”, p. 55.
88 Ibid., p. 24.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
92 For the former, see The Mystical Theology, p. 73; for the latter, see “The Procession of the Holy Spirit in Orthodox Trinitarian Thought”, p. 79.
93 Although Zizioulas cautions against collapsing the immanent Trinity into the economic Trinity, he is clearly arguing for less of an “apophatic” distance between the two realms. This is evident in Zizioulas’s interpretation of Basil’s discussion of the proper doxology in
On the Holy Spirit. According to Zizioulas’s interpretation, the difference between the two prepositions dia and syn indicate for Basil the distinction between the economic and the immanent Trinity. He adds that “If, on the other hand, one speaks of God in terms (sic) of liturgical and especially eucharistic experience, then, Basil argues, the proper doxology is that of syn. . . . The existence of God is revealed to us in the Liturgy as an event of communion . . . This is the deeper meaning—and the merit—of the syn- doxology and for that matter of a theology inspired by the Liturgy” (“The Teaching of the 2nd Ecumenical Council on the Holy Spirit in Historical and Ecumenical Perspective”, p. 39; see also, “The Doctrine of God as Trinity”, p. 30, note 20: “The first doxology is based on the economy, whereas the second one, which St. Basil defends, points to God as he is eternally or immanently, and as he is revealed and seen in the eucharistic experience of the eschata”). Zizioulas then adds, “This language which taken up by I Const. opens the way to an argument based on liturgical experience and worship and thus to a theology which does not rest upon historical or economical experience (emphasis mine) . . . Nothing however can be said about the way they exist on the basis of the way they appear in the Economy” (“The Teaching of the 2nd Ecumenical Council on the Holy Spirit in Historical and Ecumenical Perspective”, p. 39).

“The way they exist” is the hopos esti of God that is the immanent life of the Trinity, and this is revealed in the eucharist. Zizioulas appears to confuse the issue with his definition of “economy” as God’s act in history, particularly in the work of the Son who “becomes” history (see “The Doctrine of God as Trinity”, p. 24). A strict identification of the economic and immanent trinity would mean that God would become “suffering by nature”, since the Son suffered on the Cross. “This kind of God offers no real hope for Man”, whose only hope lies in a God whose being is such that transcends suffering, as witnessed in the work of the Holy Spirit who resurrects Christ (“The Doctrine of God as Trinity”, p. 24). Thus, the experience of God in the eucharist is really that of the “immanent” Trinity, since the eucharist, as the work of the Holy Spirit constituting the community as the resurrected body of Christ, is a meta-historical or meta-economical work. The Holy Spirit makes present God’s immanent life. Based on this strict definition, Zizioulas seems to be emphasizing a distinction between the economic and immanent realms. If, however, one conceives of economy more broadly, as argued above—namely, as God’s action in relation to the created realm—then Zizioulas is clearly affirming an identification, though not an exhaustive one, between the economic and the immanent Trinity. In other words, what one “experiences” of God in history, is who God is.

Reacting to Panagopoulos’s statement that the “future of Orthodox theology rests on . . . the distinction between essence and energies” (“Ontology or Theology of the Person?”), p. 46), Zizioulas adds that to make “energies” the controlling theological concept tends to make “superfluous, if not suspect, any logos or person”. A larger issue here is whether the Palamite understanding of divine energy is superfluous, or even contradictory to Zizioulas’s ontology of person. This is suggested, albeit indirectly, in Dom Illtyd Trethowan’s discussion of Lossky’s use of the Palamite notion of divine energies: “But to place a real distinction within God himself other than that of the Persons is surely not only uncalled-for but also disastrous. For it seems to destroy God’s unity” (“Lossky on Mystical Theology”, The Downside Review Vol. 92 [1974], p. 243).


For Zizioulas, the essence/energies distinction is “nothing else essentially, but a device created by the Greek Fathers to safeguard the absolute transcendence of God without alienating Him from the world” (“The Teaching of the 2nd Ecumenical Council on the Holy Spirit in Historical and Ecumenical Perspective”, p. 51). In her discussion of Zizioulas’s marginalization of the divine energies and her own critical response that “an understanding of divine energy should be maximized”, Nonna Verna Harrison misses the point that Zizioulas is attempting to minimize its use as a soteriological category. See her “Zizioulas on Communion and Otherness”, St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly Vol. 42 no. 3–4 (1998), pp. 273–300. What Zizioulas has a problem here reconciling is the fact that though Gregory Palamas admits that the energies are never apersonal, he argues that they are divine as
opposed to created for soteriological purposes. The human person becomes god, or achieves *theosis*, because the energies are divine.

97 For this reason, when Olivier Clément says that “Seule une théologie qui inclue l’ontologique dans le personnel peut unir la plénitude de la liberté personnelle à la plénitude de l’être et de la vie” (*Orient-Occident: Deux Passeurs: Vladimir Lossky et Paul Evdokimov* [Genève: Éditions Labor et Fides, 1985], p. 33), one cannot so easily agree with Clément that such a theology is that of Vladimir Lossky. Clément does not consider the tension in Lossky’s thought between a personal ontology and an epistemology rooted in apophaticism.

98 See especially *Modern Theology* Vol. 18 no 4 (October, 2002), an issue devoted to the thought of Gregory of Nyssa.